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This thesis looks beyond the tragic events of 11 March 2004 to uncover the 
greater Spanish strategic culture that motivates and influences Spain’s political elites.  By 
examining the interaction between Spanish conservatives and liberals, discerning the 
Spanish strategic culture will allow for a greater understanding of the foreign policy 
implications to both the Spanish-US relationship and Spanish-EU integration after the 
Madrid bombings.   
By understanding how Spanish elites make decisions on the utilization of military 
force with respect to NATO operations and European Union security, this thesis first 
demonstrates the strategic preferences of the Spanish elites.  Secondly, this thesis shows 
that the collective identity of Spanish elites seeks further influence in regional and global 
policymaking.  Lastly, this thesis reveals that Spain is in a unique position to develop a 
strong bilateral relationship with the US while furthering its integration with the EU but 
is unwilling to support the furthering of integration at expense of Spanish national 
interests.   
Uncovering the Spanish strategic culture will provide a possible generalization to 
whether this event will lead to a shift in the Spanish strategic culture or open a new 
chapter in the transatlantic relationship.  This thesis suggests that the bombings will not 
redefine the strategic culture of Spain but reinforce Spain’s commitment against 
international terrorism.  This commitment will help shape the EU’s cooperation and 
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I. INTRODUCTION TO SPANISH STRATEGIC CULTURE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Spain’s commitment to the global war on terror is in question in the aftermath of 
the March 11, 2004 bombings in Madrid.  While the political and military effects of the 
bombings are still becoming apparent with the decision to withdraw its forces from Iraq, 
the terrorist acts placed a significant strain on Spain’s democratic governance.  Indeed, 
one US interpretation critical of the bombings described the Spanish decision to change 
its government on March 14, 2004 as a “cowardly” act and stated that the Spanish people 
caved to the terrorist by voting for a change in government.1  Lost in this superficial 
analysis are the underlying principles of the Spanish political decision-making processes, 
which form a principle part of this analysis.     
The general elections in Spain in March 2004 demonstrated two fundamentals of 
modern Spanish political reality.  First, the Spanish people do not like the perception of 
governmental manipulation of information for political gain, and second, they do not like 
their politicians acting without consultation with public opinion.  While the politicization 
of the tragedy of Madrid incited the population to vote, the outcome of the vote 
uncovered a deep wound in Spanish mentality:  the Spanish people completely reject the 
perception of authoritarianism in their government.   
A realistic interpretation of the effects of the bombings requires an in-depth 
analysis of the Spanish political system and Spanish elite’s decision-making process.  
The Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) makes a clear distinction between the 
United States-led campaign in Iraq and the global war on terrorism.  Spanish President 
José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (PSOE) has determined that no United Nations resolution 
will come that will satisfy Spanish political demands to keep Spanish forces in Iraq.  It is 
yet undetermined whether the Madrid bombings will mark a dramatic shift in the foreign 
relations of the Spanish government with respect to the US and European Union.  A 
better understanding of how the bombings will affect the Spanish political elites and their 
                                                 
1 
1 Luttwak, E.N. 16 March 2004. “Rewarding Terror in Spain.” New York Times. 
political process, however, comes through an analysis of how Spanish elites make 
decisions in similar types of defense related crisis within the theme of strategic culture.   
This thesis looks beyond the tragic events of 11 March 2004 to uncover the 
greater Spanish strategic culture that motivates and influences Spain’s political elites.  
Spanish elites have definitive personalities and this character is better understood in the 
context of how Spanish elites have responded during similar emergencies since 1923.  
Additionally, this thesis explores the development of the Spanish strategic culture from 
1923 to 2004 to gain an appreciation of the basic political motivations and ideologies of 
the Spanish elites.  By examining the interaction between Spanish conservatives and 
liberals, discerning the Spanish strategic culture will allow for a greater understanding of 
the foreign policy implications to both the Spanish-US relationship and Spanish-EU 
integration after the Madrid bombings.   
The ties between the US and Spain are strong.  While the modern Spanish-US 
bilateral relationship is over 50 years old, the early strategic association dealt with the 
effects of an open confrontation with the Soviet Union that necessitated the US to 
maintain relations with the authoritarian Franco regime after 1949.  In light of the 
Spanish transition to democracy in 1975, the US now has more history with a democratic 
Spain than with its authoritarian past.  Moreover, the history of the US relationship with 
Spain’s Socialist government also provides a key to understanding the negotiating styles 
of the PSOE. 
Conversely, the Spanish relationship with the European Community and EU is a 
comparatively modern development, but the historical relationships with individual 
European nation-states and the EU common market provide insights to how the Spanish 
political elites see Spanish integration into EU structures.  This thesis will further assess 
the strategic culture of Spain to determine whether Spain will support both the bilateral 
relationship with the US and Spanish integration into the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).2  To analyze 
the Spanish strategic culture, this study treats the decision-making processes of Spanish 
                                                 
2 
2 The CFSP is the “second pillar” of the EU organization and “is designed to safeguard the common 
values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union, preserve peace and strengthen international 
security, promote international cooperation, and to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law 
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.”  See NATO Handbook. 2002. p. 357. 
political-military elites to discover the implications of how their decisions affect Spanish-
US affairs, NATO relations and EU integration.   
Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the CFSP writes, “We need to 
develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust 
intervention…A European Union which takes greater responsibility and which is more 
active will be one which carries greater political weight.”3  The development of the EU’s 
CFSP provides an indication for the progression of the EU towards a treaty establishing a 
constitution for its members.  Spain has a specific role in this process but Spain is in a 
position to maintain strong relationship with the US while continuing its support with 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization as well as furthering EU integration.  The European 
Security Strategy, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” provides an indication of a 
possible direction that Spain will consider to further the progression of the CFSP.4  By 
analyzing Spanish strategic culture, this thesis intends to advance an understanding of 
how Spain fits into international security processes to include the global war on terror and 
the EU’s CFSP and thereby cast light into the darkness of the rhetoric towards the US-led 
campaign in Iraq in 2003.     
B.   STRATEGIC CULTURE FRAMEWORK 
Strategic culture discussions serve as a tool to analyze the diverse nature of the 
Spanish political and military cultures that seek further integration into NATO and the 
EU while maintaining bilateral relations with the US.  Ideological divergences between 
the elites of Spain continue to produce differing results on the process and direction of 
Spanish integration into NATO and the EU.  This strategic culture analysis helps to 
determine whether ideological similarities emerge towards the use of force.  As a starting 
point, this analysis defines strategic culture as  
an integrated “system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, 
analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic 
preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in 
                                                 
3 See A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy.  European Council – Brussels, 
12 December 2003. p. 11.  As the Secretary-General/EU High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana 
directed this paper to be written for the concurrence of the EU member states.  The Counsel of the EU 
adopted the policy statement on 12 December 2003.  
4 Ibid. 
3 
interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of 
factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.” 5 
This strategic culture analysis will examine Spanish domestic considerations that 
affected their internal and external decision-making processes.  By elucidating the 
reaction of Spanish elites in times of political and social crisis, strategic preferences will 
become apparent suggesting how strategic culture ultimately provided limits to Spanish 
decision-making processes.6  Cultural explanations also help to account for why Spanish 
elites react differently in similar situations or to similar questions.  The variation of the 
reaction of the elites shows that the socialization of those elites to a particular ideology or 
theoretical foundation affects their decision-making processes.  By analyzing how elites 
make critical decisions during a political-military crisis, this study shows how domestic 
considerations influence strategic culture. 
This strategic culture study will investigate Spain’s recent political-military 
experiences during periods of relative crisis since 1975.  By defining strategic culture in 
terms of how elites react to crises, the analysis demonstrates how radical changes in the 
domestic and international conditions, such as the terrorist act in March 2004, may lead 
to changes in political orientation.  A problem exists, however, because strategic culture 
discussions often misrepresent concepts of ethnocentricity and culture by overstating a 
national character that influences decisions of the government.7 
Within the realm of security, developing a collective identity may also play a role 
in the development of a strategic culture.8  Strategic culture examines the “historically 
based inertia” that influences decision-making by means other than power discussion.9  
This theory does not completely reject a realist argument that strategic decisions are 
based on “optimizing power, constrained only, or largely, by variables such as 
                                                 
5 See Johnston, A. I. “Thinking About Strategic Culture,” International Security, Vol 19, No. 4 Spring 
95. p. 46. Johnston paraphrases Geertz.  Geertz’s original definition concerned religion as a cultural system.  
The Interpretation of Cultures. (New York. Basic Books, 1973), p. 90. 
6 Johnston, A.I. “Thinking About Strategic Culture.” International Security, Vol 19, No. 4 Spring 95. 
p. 34. 
7 Ethnocentricity is used as a term to describe feelings of group centrality and superiority…as a technical 
term to describe another culture in terms of one’s own…(or) the inability of an individual group to see the 
world through the eyes of a different national or ethnic group.  Booth, K.  1979. Strategy and 




geography, capability, threat, and a tendency of states to refrain from behaviors which 
clearly threaten their immediate survival.”10  The key point is that  
elites socialized in different strategic cultures will make different choices 
when placed in similar situations.  Since cultures are attributes of and vary 
across states, similar strategic realities will be interpreted differently.  So 
the problem for culturalists is to explain similarities in strategic behavior 
across varied strategic cultures…While there is no a priori reason for 
predictions about strategic choice derived from strategic culture to be 
different from predictions derived from ahistorical structural approaches 
(any differences depend on the content of a strategic culture), there is no a 
priori reason for them to be the same either.11 
 
The overarching argument in this thesis is that the strategic culture of Spain 
supports a bilateral relationship with the US, along with NATO participation and EU 
integration into the CFSP and ESDP.   
C.   METHODOLOGY  
Recent interpretations of strategic culture have sought rigorous and durable 
explanatory methods.  Chapter II of this thesis will analyze the socialization and 
ideological orientation of Spanish elites.  In Chapters III, IV and V, this thesis will 
develop a cognitive map of three key strategic discussions pertaining to security and 
defense related areas:   
1. What were Spanish elite’s attitudes towards NATO integration from 1951 to 
1996? 
 
2. What are Spanish elite’s attitudes towards participation and support of non-
territorial defense missions from 1982-2004? 
 
3. How is Spain progressing towards participation and integration into the 
European Security and Defense Policy? 
 
Chapter VI of this thesis will develop conclusions to how the strategic culture of 
Spain either contributes or hinders Spanish elite’s decision-making process towards the 
application of the use of force in foreign policy, security missions or military operations 
within the context of coalition, NATO or EU security missions.  
By understanding how Spanish elites make decisions on the utilization of military 
operations and European Union security, this thesis first force with respect to NATO                                                  
10 De Mesquita, B. 1981. The Time Warp. New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press. pp. 29-30, 64 in 
Johnston p. 65. 
11 Johnston. p. 35. 
5 
demonstrates the strategic preferences of the Spanish elites.  Secondly, this thesis shows 
that the collective identity of Spanish elites seeks further influence in regional and global 
policymaking.  Lastly, this thesis reveals that Spain is in a unique position to develop a 
strong bilateral relationship with the US while furthering its security integration with the 
EU but is unwilling to support the furthering EU integration at expense of Spanish 
national interests.   
Uncovering the Spanish strategic culture will provide a possible generalization to 
any lasting effects of the March 11 train bombings in Madrid.  The question remains 
whether this event will lead to a shift in the Spanish strategic culture or open a new 
chapter in the transatlantic relationship.  This thesis suggests that the bombings will not 
redefine the strategic culture of Spain but reinforce Spain’s commitment against 
international terrorism.  This commitment will help shape the EU’s cooperation and 






II. THE SOCIALIZATION OF SPANISH POLITICAL AND 
MILITARY ELITES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter lays out the roots of both conservative and liberal ideologies in 
modern Spanish society from 1898 to 1975.  This chapter defines the political and 
military elites as well as follows the development of those Spanish elites through 
industrialization in the late 19th and early 20th century, the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera 
of 1923-1931, the Second Republic of 1931-1936, the Spanish Civil War from 1936-1939 
and the dictatorship of Franco until 1975.  In modern Spanish history, H. M. King Juan 
Carlos provided the appropriate leadership needed to allow for the development of 
democracy in Spain.  The interaction in this period between political elites provides a 
valuable insight to the strategic culture of the Spanish government and has lasting effects 
on the modern political processes in Spain.  
During this modern period, three critical phases affected the development of 
Spain’s political elites.  In the first phase from 1898-1931, initial clashes between 
conservative and liberal ideologies demonstrated the inequities brought on by uneven 
industrialization.  The perceived weakness of the government during this period led to the 
direct intervention of the military.  Conflicts arose between Spanish conservatives and 
regional nationalists that defined the ideological orientation of groups within Spanish 
political and military elites.  As liberalism gained greater influence, a conservative 
backlash led to the dictatorship of General Primo De Rivera from 1923-1931.  After the 
failure of the dictatorship to develop significant reforms for the Spanish people, 
liberalism again triumphed and the King signaled his willingness to allow an elected 
government form. 
The second key phase in modern Spanish history begins from the rise of the 
political parties that ultimately shaped both the Second Republic and the Franco regime 
from 1931-1949.  The Second Republic lasted from 1931-1936 and signaled a tumultuous 
beginning of democracy in Spain.  Following the breakdown of civil society after the 
Second Republic, the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939 led to the Franco dictatorship.  
Understanding the political orientation and the socialization of the Spanish elites in the 
7 
pre-Franco democracy is necessary to develop an initial understanding of the strategic 
culture of the Second Republic and the strategic cultures of the early Franco regime.   
The final portion of this chapter deals with the effects of the shifting attitudes of 
the political and military elites from 1949 to 1975.  Domestic as well as international 
concerns affected the decisions of the Spanish elites causing the creation of the climate 
that allowed Franco to shift his foreign policy towards the US and more normalized 
relations with Western Europe.  Following the death of Franco in 1975, a constitutional 
monarchy formed with democratically elected government. 
B. ROOTS OF CONSERVATISM AND LIBERALISM IN SPAIN  
The conservative movement of the Spanish Right is rooted in several parts of 
Spanish social and political mentality.  From a historical standpoint, Spanish 
independence began in the Eleventh century through territorial conquest and kingdom 
consolidation.  For the next six centuries, Spain became the most dominant global power 
of the time.  By the 17th century, unlike England, France and Austria, the Spanish 
monarchy was not able to develop adequate federal structures with “centralized 
institutions.” Consequently, the organizational arrangement of the state developed as 
more of a confederation of regions with a weak center allowing for various degrees of 
regional autonomy.12  Because of the relative weakness of the central government to the 
autonomous regions, the central government had no ability to challenge this regional 
status quo arrangement.13   
Traditionally, “National Catholicism” was able to resist secularization primarily 
because the church and its structures became identified with “culture and tradition.”14  
Because Spain faced no real external threats after the defeat of Napoleon and due to its 
geographical location and the lack of power-projection ability in the early 20th century, 
Spain was able to avoid major involvement in the highly destructive wars during that 
time.15  Finally, “Classical liberalism dominated Spanish political life for most of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, discouraging military and aggressive 
                                                 
12 Schulze, H. 1996.  States, Nations and Nationalism.  Malden, Mass.  Blackwell Publishers Ltd. p. 
286. 




ambitions.”16  The elitist mentality remained strong in Spain through either “classical 
liberalism or traditional Catholicism, discouraging the introduction or diffusion of new 
doctrines or philosophies except in the working class subculture.”17 
In the early part of the 20th century, problems existed in Spain that resulted in 
regional divergences forming between the industrial and non-industrial sectors of the 
Kingdom.  Following a similar pattern to several European countries during 
industrialization with the advent of Socialism, Spain was “on the threshold between an 
industrial and agrarian economy.”18  Desires for more regional autonomy began to take 
hold in the northern industrial areas that aspired to such nationalistic beliefs as those of 
the Catalans and the Basques.  The Catalans supposed that they “had a distinct historical 
and cultural identity of their own” while the Basques believed that their nationality 
“expressed the pride and ambition of Spain.” 19  While this description is a simplification 
of the dynamics of these two regions with respect to the government, the point remains 
that the divergence of these two industrial regions from the rest of the “agrarian” portions 
of Spain led to the formation of two distinct working class entities:  the Anarcho-
Syndicalists and the Socialists.20   
Industrialization developed unevenly through Spain.  Consequently, the northern 
industrial regions of Euskadi (País Vasco), Aragón, Navarra and Catalunya (Cataluña) 
disliked sharing this new wealth with the poorer and “less educated” southern regions.  
Though the regions had different languages and traditions from Castilian Spain, this weak 
form of regional nationalism also developed unevenly.  The modern Basque Country 
(País Vasco) and other autonomous regions of Aragón, Navarra and Catalunya developed 
an “inverted” form of nationalism as comparison with other forms of European 
nationalism.  “Peripheral nationalism,” as demonstrated by the peoples of the 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Schulze p. 286. 
19 Payne, S.G. 1967. Franco’s Spain. New York. Thomas Y. Crowell Company. p. xiii. 
9 
20 Anarcho-Syndicalism becomes the anarchist wing of the developing labor union movement in 
Spain.  Its key propositions are workers’ solidarity, direct action and self management.  This movement 
became the single-most powerful force for the left and became “a force characterized by spontaneous 
revolutionary enthusiasm and a wild cult of liberty.”  Wilkinson, J. and Hughes, H.S.  2004.  Contemporary 
Europe – A History (Tenth Edition).  Upper Saddle River, NJ.  Pearson Prentice Hall.  P. 286. 
autonomous regions of Catalan and Basque national groups, fought against the 
maturation of a strong Spanish nation-state.21    
While comprised of mainly peasants and the working class, the Spanish Left in 
the industrial regions developed three key agenda points:  increased representation in 
government for the working class; increased regional autonomy; and less influence of the 
Catholic Church in government.  This liberal agenda came too quickly for the 
conservative portions of the government leading to the imposition of a seven-year 
military dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera from 1923-1931.  This military 
action only caused the delay in the rise of this left-wing movement.22  
C.  1931-1947:  BREAKDOWN OF THE REPUBLIC AND THE RISE OF 
FRANCO  
King Alfonso XIII supported the beginning of the dictatorship and subsequently, 
ordered the ending of the dictatorship.  The King dismissed Primo de Rivera in January 
1930 because the dictator failed to instill any clear political or social doctrine.  This lack 
of direction led to a collapse of the economy, a lack of faith from the military and no 
governmental consensus with the Socialists.   
The total ineffectiveness of the right-wing government caused not only the failure 
of the dictatorship but also brought down the monarchy.  The King “announced the 
restoration of the constitution and, as an initial token of the return of liberty, scheduled 
the election of municipal councilors for mid-April 1931.”23  The campaign quickly turned 
into a direct vote against the continuance of the monarchy.  Believing this “tidal wave” of 
opposition was turning hostile, King Alfonso fled the “country without abdicating.”24   
On April 14, 1931, the Second Republic led by the Socialist reformists such as 
Manuel Azaña undertook primary efforts to instill democratic order in the government.  
He immediately began to attack the authoritarian tendencies of the conservative right by 
reducing the role of the military in the government, by granting autonomy to the Basque 
and Catalan regions and by separating the state from the church.25  The policies of the 
first government of the Second Republic created a backlash in the electorate due to the 
                                                 
21 Payne (1995) p. 263-64.  
22 Ibid. p. 254. 
23 Wilkinson, et al. p. 284. 
24 Ibid. p. 285. 
25 Ibid. p. 286. 
10 
perceived effort of the left government to “persecute the Catholic Church…The reaction 
to this took the form of a new authoritarian right and victory for the center and right in 
the second republican elections of 1933.”26   
From this defeat, the left splintered from a democratic reformist platform to a 
more radical “Bolshevization” revolutionary ideology.27  Within this divided Left, four 
primary parties emerged:  Partido Comunista de España (PCE – Communist Party); 
Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE - Socialists); the Esquerra Republicana de 
Catalunya (ERC – Catalan Republican Left) and Unión Republicana (UR – Republican 
Union Party).28     
Following the victory of the Spanish Right in the general elections of 1933, 
authoritarian nationalism defined this early phase of democratic Spanish politics with the 
Spanish Right developing three distinctive groupings:  the Fascists (Falange Espanola); 
the Radical Right: Carlists (Catholic Corporatism) and Renovación Española 
(Authoritarian Monarchists) and neo-authoritarian Alfonsine monarchists (Acción 
Española); and the Conservative Right: Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rightist 
Groups (CEDA). 29 
During the period from 1933-1936, CEDA remained the largest political party in 
Spain followed by the Radical Right groups of Carlists and traditional monarchists of the 
Renovación Española.   The Falangists remained largely unimportant as a political party 
taking only 0.7% of the votes in the 1936 elections.30  The primary reason for the 
rejection of fascism was that as long as “the regular political system” remained viable, 
fascism could not gain momentum.31    
The driving force towards authoritarianism in Spain was the radical right platform 
developed by Jose Calvo Sotelo.  Prior to the Civil War, Sotelo had become 
the key leader of the small monarchists Spanish Renovation Party and 
organized a broader right nationalist grouping, the National Bloc, in 1934-
35…Sotelo proposed not the restoration but the installation (instauración) 
of an authoritarian new monarchy, whose reign would have to be preceded 
by an indeterminate period of dictatorship.  He understood clearly that this 
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was unlikely to come about through political mobilization but would 
probably require forcible intervention by the military.  Parliament would 
have to be replaced by an indirect corporate chamber representing social 
and economic interests, and a strong government would then be in a 
position to stimulate the economy through state regulation and reflationary 
policies.32 
 
Prior to the 1936 general elections, however, the reunified Left created an alliance 
- the Popular Front – that subsequently defeated the National Bloc by a narrow margin to 
regain control of the Spanish Parliament or Cortes.33  The Popular Front government 
began its reformation of the government by purging much of the National Bloc right and 
making the Falange Espanola illegal.34  Following a Leftist-police led assassination of 
Sotelo on 12 July 1936, tensions between the Left and Right ignited leading to a military 
uprising on 17 July 1936 and the subsequent breakdown of Spanish civil society.35  This 
breakdown of civil society was the beginning of the Spanish Civil War. 
From 1935 to 1936, the Falangists, led by José Antonio Primo de Rivera (son of 
the former dictator), received significant financial support from the Italian fascist regime 
allowing the party to survive the rejection from the Left and the Radical Right 
movements in Spain.36  After the start of the Civil War, as the conservative and radical 
right became increasingly disenfranchised by the actions of the left, the actions and 
successes of the left during the civil war allowed the Falangist’s party to grow.  
Though disillusioned rightists – primarily the young – began to flock to 
the clandestine, partially disarticulated movement, the collapse of political 
order erased the very concept of political victory in the Italian or German 
senses, and even Falangists had never seen that as a practical possibility.37 
 
In 1935, the Minister of War appointed General Francisco Franco as the Chief of 
Staff of the Army.  As a monarchist, the right wing government of Spain approved of 
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Franco and his brutal tactics.38  While Chief of Staff of the Army, Franco systematically 
purged the Army hierarchy of Republican and liberal officers.39    
After the elections of 1936, the new Left government sent Franco to govern the 
Canary Islands.  After the beginning of the Civil War, he flew to Tetuán, Morocco and 
assumed command of the Army of Africa.40  While not involved in the initial uprising 
against the Republican government, Franco led his African Army into Southern Spain 
and seized control of Andalucía and Sevilla.41  By September 1936, the nine other 
generals involved in the uprising selected Franco to lead the Right-wing Nationalist 
Army. 
At the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal, Hermann Goering testified that Franco 
had requested assistance from Hitler.  Goering knew that Franco desperately needed 
airlift assistance to get his army across the Mediterranean.  Franco considered the option 
of naval transport but the forces loyal to the Republicans and Communists controlled the 
Spanish navy.  Goering advised Hitler to give the assistance to prevent the further spread 
of communism and to test “his young Luftwaffe in this or that technical respect.”42 
The effects of foreign intervention in the Spanish Civil war cannot be over 
emphasized.  “Franco was openly supported by large shipments of equipment from 
Germany and Italy; soon thereafter, German and Italian “volunteers” were dispatched, 
and fascism seemed poised to spread its ideas by force.”43  For the Spanish liberals, no 
primary benefactor came forward that was willing to provide military or political support 
to help defeat the right-wing insurgency.  The International Brigades did provide some 
support but they had more of an important symbolic role as the representation of the 
struggle for the Republic’s quest for democracy.   
Communism did develop in Spain but not in the model of the Soviet Union.  The 
Trotskyites saw the opportunity for a “new revolution” against the fascist right but Stalin 
saw Spain as a danger for Soviet Communism.  Not wanting to antagonize the British or 
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the French, Stalin “was not prepared to do much in a concrete way to combat fascism, for 
any support of revolution in the West would alienate the bourgeois powers…that he 
might need against Hitler.”44  Stalin sent the NKVD to Spain to “liquidate” the 
Trotskyites and to “direct” the Spanish Communists.  “Soviet involvement in Spanish 
affairs was directed less at supporting the Republic than at preventing it from falling into 
a socialist revolution.”45  
The foreign intervention or lack of assistance, as the case may be, carried 
consequences for the British and the French for the next several decades.  The Spanish 
left looked to the friendly governments of Britain and France for support.  Great Britain 
declined because of the desire to maintain neutrality but they “either failed to perceive a 
threat to the balance of power in a fascist victory in Spain or it perceived fascism as a 
lesser threat than a radical left-wing Spain tied to the Soviet Union.”46  The British  
Cabinet warned France that Great Britain reserved the right to remain 
neutral if a war should result from French arms deliveries to republican 
Spain – even though, under international law, France had every right to 
sell arms to the legitimate Spanish government.  France waffled, then 
proclaimed an embargo on arms shipments while periodically acquiescing 
in its violation.  That policy, however, only demoralized France’s friends 
and cost France the respect of its adversaries.47 
   
After the execution of José Antonio at the hands of the Republicans in April 1937, 
Franco assumed command of the entire right-wing movement but controlled the group 
with a broader approach:  
The entity that Franco elevated into partido único in April 1937 
was not, however, integral Falangism but a union of Falangists, Carlists 
and all the other members of various rightist and other groups who were 
willing to join.  Though the Falangist program – now the Twenty-six 
Points – was raised to the official state doctrine, Franco specifically 
announced that this was to be understood merely as a point of departure 
and would be modified or elaborated depending upon future 
requirements.48 
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In reality, Franco adopted the “structures and policies” of the Acción Española 
put forth by Sotelo before his death.49  While Franco became dictator with the help of 
German and Italian military and financial assistance, he ruled independently with the 
assistance of “an eclectic mixture of right-wing military elites, a fascist state party, and 
various sectors of conservatives and monarchists, all buttressed by the strong support of a 
revitalized neo-traditional Catholicism.”50   
In external relations, Franco’s foreign policy shifted three times during his 38 
years as dictator:  twice during World War II and again in 1947 towards the US.  In 1938, 
Franco’s first policy shift was from neutral to non-belligerency towards Germany.  
Franco believed that Hitler betrayed him during the Sudetan crisis in 1938 by curtailing 
German support for the Spanish Civil War.  In 1938, Franco’s strategic vision for Spain 
was the unity of Spain through the defeat of the Republicans.  As noted, Franco was 
willing to accept German and Italian support for operations against the 2nd Republic of 
Spain to obtain this end.   
Ironically, Hitler’s designs against Czechoslovakia led to Franco’s pledge of 
neutrality in WW II and surprisingly, the Spanish Republican’s defeat.  Franco became 
worried in September 1938 that German aspirations in Czechoslovakia might signal an 
end to German and Italian support for the Spanish Nationalists.  The Civil War in Spain 
was still in question and Franco and the Republican leader, Juan Negrin, saw the move on 
the Sudetan as an escalation that would allow for the alignment of the Republicans with 
the British, French and Russians against the Spanish Nationalists.51  Franco felt betrayed 
by Hitler.   Franco’s forces were thin and could not withstand an attack from France in 
the North if such an alignment occurred.  British and French governments contacted 
Spain to find out “what (Spain) would do in the event of a general war in Europe.”52 
Additionally, the US had been systematically starving the Franco regime of 
strategic oil reserves.  The priority for the US was to deny Franco the ability to supply 
Germany or Italy with oil from Spanish reserves.  “It was a shrewd policy which neither 
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gave Franco the confidence to go to war nor threw him entirely on the mercy of the Third 
Reich.”53  
During the early years of transformation, Spanish governments sought to greater 
the economic and political ties with allies through its support of operations abroad that 
supported its allies. In this matter, Franco was a shrewd negotiator.  On 18 Jun 1940, 
Franco offered to enter to the war on the side of the axis if Hitler would give Spain  
war materials, heavy artillery, aircraft for the attack on Gibraltar, and 
perhaps the cooperation of German submarines in the defense of the 
Canary Islands.  Also supplies of some foodstuffs, ammunition, motor fuel 
and equipment, which will certainly be available from the French war 
stocks.54  
 
Franco also had “colonial ambitions” in Northern Africa.  Hitler, however, had 
strategic interests that went against the priorities of the Franco regime.  Hitler was 
unwilling to cede any of the Northern African regions because of his agreements with 
France in Northern Africa. 
Later in 1939, Franco maintained Spain’s position of neutrality because of 
Spanish perceptions towards the invasion of Poland in 1939.  Franco saw too many 
comparisons between the Polish authoritarian, Catholic regime and his own. 55  After the 
fall of France in 1940, in a clear policy shift, Franco offered to enter WWII on the side of 
the axis but Hitler declined the assistance because the price that Franco wanted was too 
high economically and politically for Hitler to pay.56  Germany was to guarantee 
extensive military and economic assistance, as well as “cession to Spain of much of 
French Northwest Africa, including all of Morocco and northwestern Algeria.” 57  Hitler 
would not do this because of his alliance with the Vichy French and his concerns for the 
Italian’s African aspirations after the war.  
To Franco, Germany could accept Spanish help with the economic conditions and 
cessions of lands in Africa or it would get token support during the war.  For example, in 
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1942, Franco would not allow Germany to transit Spain to seize Gibraltar fearing British 
reprisals in the Canary Islands.   
With the early success of Germany in WWII, the fascists within the Spanish 
regime demanded more power.  Franco saw this development along with other domestic 
concerns as a challenge brought on by the Falangists.  In 1942, Franco “adroitly” handled 
this balance of domestic control problem by allowing 20,000 Falangist volunteers 
(Falangist Blue Shirt Division) to fight with the Germans while supporting the German 
invasion of Russia.58  By allowing these volunteers to leave, Franco provided reciprocal 
support for Hitler as well as reducing the internal threat of the Falangists in Spain. 
Franco saw the advantage of maintaining normalized relations with Germany.  In 
1939, over 500,000 Republican refugees left Spain for France.  While Germany still 
maintained control over the territory of France, the Spanish Republicans had no clear 
marshalling area to launch a serious offensive against the Franco regime.  Consequently, 
the Republican movement weakened during WWII and slowly degenerated into small 
guerilla activities with limited successes after 1949.59 
The strategic preferences of the early Franco regime centered on the maintenance 
of the Franco’s control of the Spanish state.  Franco gave support if that support would 
either further the territorial ambitions of the Caudillo or maintain Franco’s unchallenged 
position within Spain.  While the basic premise of the Franco regime did not change after 
WW II, Franco had to seek international support to maintain control of the country. 
Following the Civil War and the post-WW II isolation, the Spanish regime had 
little international legitimacy.  A conjuncture of events led to the reversal of this 
international ostracism of Spain:  the redefinition of the Spanish Right, a shift in the 
foreign policy of Franco and the increased threat of worldwide communism.  
The redefinition of the Spanish right began with the reinstitution of the Monarchy 
in 1947.  Franco reinstituted the monarchy in 1947 but retained the power of Regent for 
life.  “Through an arrangement with Don Juan, son of Alfonso XIII, Franco was able to 
groom Juan Carlos as his successor, supervising the prince’s education in Spain from an 
early age.”60  In another redefinition of the right, starting in 1942 and through 1951, 
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Franco began the defascistization of the Spanish government.  While Falange Espanola 
remained the only authorized party in Spain after 1945, the members began to redefine 
themselves into a political party that resembled an  
image as that of a Catholic, organic, and corporative system, based on 
church, professionalism, municipality, and family – a system that 
supposedly had never favored the Axis or sought to imitate it politically.61 
 
Wanting to shed the fascist label, Spain had redefined itself by 1947 as a 
“corporative, Catholic monarchy.”62  Moreover, the unified right wing changed its name 
from Falange Espanola to the Movimiento Nacional.  Additionally, the Catholic Church 
gained further influence through the Opus Dei gaining much political support through its 
ties with the Catholic Church, consequently with Franco, thereby influencing, and 
liberalizing the political and economic processes that would allow for technological and 
economic modernization.63 
A key strength of the Franco regime came from the loyalty and support that 
Franco received from the military.  Franco maintained a special relationship with his 
generals allowing the military to gain from this rapport.  From 1938-1945, the Spanish 
military held 46% of all ministerial positions and 37% of all other positions within the 
government.  Franco utilized the Army in Spain primarily for the internal suppression of 
rebellion and regional nationalism.  He “deliberately sought to instill in the armed forces 
a narrow preoccupation with internal rather than external threats to Spain, thereby 
building upon a tradition of military intervention which has its roots in the early 
nineteenth century.”64 
D. 1947-1975:  CONSOLIDATION OF THE FRANCO REGIME 
As for an analysis of the Spanish army during the dictatorship, critics describe 
three main factors that shaped the Spanish army.  First, the military had too many officers 
for the number of conscripted personnel.  Consequently, the officers “tended to be too old 
for their rank and responsibilities.”65  Second, “the Spanish army frequently responded to 
a self-defined notion of patriotism…defending Spain from allegedly incompetent 
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politicians.”66  Third, the Spanish armed services “demonstrated an acute sensitivity to 
civilian criticism, intensified by widespread popular hostility to conscription and the 
regular use of the army to crush social agitation.”67 
 In fact, the Army responded more due to the political weakness of the 
government than to any desire to instill a singular ideological position.  Franco’s generals 
benefited from a “special relationship” with the Caudillo that gave them “greater 
potential veto power than any other single group, not excluding the Church hierarchy.”68  
Because of this relationship, however, the Army did not challenge the “political structure 
of the state.”69     
By 12 December 1946, the United Nations had enacted a resolution against the 
Franco regime that was the basis for the systematic international ostracism of his regime.  
In doing so, Franco was able to pit his struggle as an epic contest between the powerful 
West and the struggling Spain.  While keeping this “heroic struggle” for Spanish 
independence from tyranny in the domestic forefront, “Franco and Carrero Blanco put 
considerable effort into making his regime acceptable to the same western 
democracies.”70   
With the changing international environment between the US and the Soviet 
Union in January 1947, Franco began to see the opportunity to develop Spain’s 
relationship with Washington.  In March 1947, Franco dispatched José Félix de 
Lequereica to Washington to create a Spanish lobby targeting “influential American 
Catholics, anti-Communists, military planners, anti-Truman Republicans and 
businessmen with interests in Spain.”71  While the Spanish lobby could count on support 
from influential Senators like Joseph McCarthy, Republican Senator from Wisconsin, the 
lobby gained quick support from “the deeply Catholic” Senator Pat McCarran of the 
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Senate Appropriations Committee who began pushing Dean Acheson and the US State 
Department towards normalized relations with Spain.72   
By February 1949, the Spanish lobby in the US made considerable ground in 
developing its relationship with the US Congress and then the US State Department.  The 
Truman administration, behind inquiries from Republican Leader Senator Arthur H. 
Vandenburg, Democratic Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Tom 
Connelly and Judge John Lee, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
became compelled to consider normalizing relations with Spain.  With pressure from 
McCarran, Acheson wrote a letter on 18 January 1950 
admitting that the 1946 (UN) resolution had failed…(and) that the United 
States was prepared to vote for a resolution permitting member nations to 
send ambassadors to Madrid and Spain admitted to international technical 
agencies.  Referring to the political origins of the regime, Acheson 
indicated that fuller integration into Western Europe, including 
presumably NATO, would require political liberalization in Spain.73 
 
Spain was able to secure a loan for $25 million with Spanish gold as collateral 
from Chase Manhattan and National City Banks of New York.74  Moreover, during the 
period covered by the Marshall Plan from 1949-1952, the US loaned Spain 
approximately $52.7 million and provided another $100,000 in grants for the Food for 
Peace program.75  While this amount paled in comparison to other contributions to other 
post-WW II recipients, the payment demonstrated a change in the perception of the US 
towards the Spanish regime.    
As the Spanish extreme right began to move towards a more centrist position, 
Franco and the Spanish government became more palatable to the liberal west because of 
Spain’s strong anti-communist views, the communistic threat in France and Italy and 
Spain’s strategic location.  The US Joint Chiefs also continued to press for the reversal of 
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the US position towards the Franco regime.76  While “Truman’s attitude towards Franco 
did not change” towards Spain, paranoia swept the US Administration over the spread of 
communism and the ability of the US military to defend Europe. 77  
With the doubts growing about the West’s defensive capabilities, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff pressed for an alliance with Spain in order to be able to use 
Iberia as ‘the last foothold in continental Europe’ without which re-entry 
into Soviet-held Europe might not be possible.  At first, Truman regarded 
the demands of General Omar Bradley, chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
as politically unrealistic.78 
 
After World War II, the United States became increasingly concerned with 
security in Western Europe.  With the revelation of the Soviet atomic bomb, the victory 
of Mao Tse-Tung in China and the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, 
Franco understood Spain’s position within the scope of the developing power positions in 
Europe and the perceived threat of communism by Western powers.79  Western 
governments were coming to the same realization.  President Truman was willing to 
maintain a policy of containment against the Soviet Union but the actions of North Korea 
on 24 June 1950 changed the “strategy of containment to a more aggressive response to 
Soviet expansionism.”80  The Spanish lobby in Washington began a campaign of support 
for the US against the actions of the communists and declared, “Spain had a half a 
million men to resist” in Korea as part of the international force if the US would arm its 
troops.81   
In Europe, however, Spanish efforts for reintegration were not successful.  By 
September 11, 1950 in London, the foreign office realized that the policy of ostracism 
towards Spain was not effective and that Spain should be brought “back into the 
international community, ‘despite Franco.’  However, after lengthy considerations, Bevin 
decided that there should be no change.”82  NATO, however, provided the necessary 
links for the US to pressure Western European leaders to “include Spain,” if not in the 
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Alliance, with diplomatic and economic reintegration because of the “strategic 
importance of the Iberian Peninsula.”83  
1. 1953 Bases Pact 
The North Korea assault ignited a flurry of diplomatic activity between the US 
and Spain.  “On 31 October 1950, the Special Ad Hoc Political Committee meeting at 
Lake Success, New York, voted to drop the December 1946 resolutions on withdrawal of 
ambassadors.”84  By 19 January 1951, Truman named Stanton Griffis, Ambassador to 
Spain. 85  This diplomatic activity paved the way for direct conversations between Griffis 
and Franco.  On 31 March 1951, Truman instructed Griffis to discuss the religious 
repression of Protestants in Northern Spain with Franco.  Unless the Caudillo would 
make a gesture towards loosening of the religious persecution of Protestants, Truman 
would be unable to sustain support for Spain in budget discussions for the following year.  
Franco acquiesced and declared that he would discuss the matter at the next cabinet 
meeting.86   
Having seemingly solved the religious hurdles that would take ten years for 
Franco to take seriously, Griffis began discussing defense related issues.   
Griffis then asked Franco directly if he was prepared to join NATO.  The 
Caudillo replied that he thought a bilateral pact with the United States 
more appropriate.  Griffis, aware of the views of the United States’ other 
allies, replied that separate negotiations with Spain would be difficult.  He 
then asked Franco if he would be prepared to send them Spanish troops to 
fight with American and other NATO forces beyond the Pyrenees.  After 
some prevarication, and pressure from Griffis, Franco said that he would 
collaborate in a wider defense effort.  Griffis pushed even further, asking 
Franco outright if, in the event of conversations between the Spanish and 
American general staffs, Spain might put her air, land, and naval bases at 
the disposal of the USA.  Franco replied that the two world wars had 
shown that all nations belonged to great coalitions and, that being the case, 
the military bases would be made available to the western allies although 
they would remain Spanish.87   
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The British and the French opposed Spain’s inclusion into the North Atlantic 
Alliance.  The continued controversy over Gibraltar stood in the way of furthering the 
relations between Britain and Spain.  While the Spanish and the British maintained 
diplomatic relationships, Franco’s aggressive rhetoric placed the British in the same 
category as the Moors whereby Franco could be a “great warrior leader of Spanish 
history.  Just as the Catholic kings had expelled the Moors, he would like to expel the 
infidel freemasons of perfidious Albion.”88  Franco organized Falangist rallies and 
student demonstrations in support of the quest for the return of Gibraltar.  In reality, 
Franco maintained this position to draw attention away from his negotiations with the US 
without interference from the Falangists still within his government.89  Additionally, the 
French did not like the prospects of the Spanish rearmament to the South and that an 
agreement with Spain would mean, “that in the event of a Soviet attack, the US would 
abandon France and dig in behind the Pyrenees.”90  Regardless of the motives, “European 
political opinion remained unremittingly hostile to Franco and…ensure(d) that Spain 
would never enter NATO while he was in power.91  Franco, as well, maintained a certain 
level of hostility towards the European members of NATO because of Portugal’s 
inclusion into the Alliance.  The fact that NATO would admit Portugal and not Spain 
demonstrated the “hypocrisy” of the European members of the alliance.92 
While no European country was willing to allow Spain to enter the alliance, the 
US pressure on the alliance resulted in Western European governments reconsidering 
their positions towards the Spanish government.  As a result, France reopened its borders 
with Spain and other administrations reestablished ambassadorial and diplomatic ties 
with Spain.93   
The political pressure from the pro-Spain congressional members combined with 
the US military’s resolve to strengthen their European defenses drove Truman to submit 
to the wishes of the Joint Chiefs.  NSC-68 provided the momentum for developing 
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bilateral relations with Spain.  Under NSC-68, the report to the US President 
recommended that he should  
direct the National Security Council, under the continuing direction of the 
President…to coordinate and insure the implementation of the 
Conclusions herein on an urgent and continuing basis for as long as 
necessary to achieve our objectives.  For this purpose, representatives of 
the member Departments and Agencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff or their 
deputies, and other Departments and Agencies as required should be 
constituted as a revised and strengthened staff organization under the 
National Security Council to develop coordinated programs for 
consideration by the National Security Council.94 
 
In light of this, Truman stated to Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval 
Operations, “I don’t like Franco and I never will but I won’t let my personal feelings 
override the convictions of you military men.”95  
By April 1951, the Commander-in-Chief Naval Forces in the Eastern 
Atlantic and Mediterranean had been instructed by the US Joint Chiefs of 
Staff to make contact with the appropriate Spanish military authorities to 
lay down the basis for future co-operation and for the establishment of 
American air and naval bases on Spanish territory.96 
  
Admiral Richard L. Conolly, Commander of US Naval Forces in the Eastern 
Atlantic and the Mediterranean pushed for sea bases in Spain.  Additionally, the 
Secretary of Defense, Louis A. Johnson, “who had initiated an economy programme 
which had cut plans for a big expansion of the US aircraft-carrier fleet, Johnson was 
particularly interested in land bases for American bombers.”97    
Franco realized the implications of having foreign troops on Spanish territory but 
the domestic situation for his country was worsening.  “Per capita meat consumption in 
Spain in 1950 was only half of what it had been in 1926 and bread consumption only half 
of what it had been in 1936.”98  Without foreign assistance, the strikes and general unrest 
prevalent had the potential to escalate into a challenge of Franco’s control over the 
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country.  “The logic of the situation demanded Spain’s integration into the international 
economy and more American credit.”99  
On 16 July 1951, Franco met with CNO Admiral Sherman and he provided 
Franco with the “American needs in terms of air bases and anchorage facilities for 
aircraft-carriers.”100  Franco responded strategically in that “bases to the USA would 
provoke an immediate attack from the Soviet Air Force and claimed that Spanish forces 
needed to bring to a point at which they could resist the Russians.”101 
“Franco’s desire to squeeze the highest price possible was overridden by his 
feverish anxiety to clinch a deal.”102  Franco made his cabinet and military staffs 
immediately available for negotiations to begin.  Franco also reshuffled his cabinet by 
including General Agustin Munoz as the Minister of War and Gabriel Arias Salgado as 
the Minister of Information and Tourism.  This move reinforced the cabinet’s anti-
communism slant by placing General Munoz, who had led the Blue Division against the 
Soviets in WW II and awarded the Iron Cross by Hitler, as the Minister of War.  
Additionally, Salgado had controlled the Spanish press during WW II that supported the 
rhetoric towards the interests of the Germans.103  While this move seemed to contradict 
the de-falangization of the Spanish regime,  
the political obsolescence of the Falange meant that Franco could count 
absolutely on the loyalty of those who had nowhere else to go.  He knew 
that by making the Falangists accomplices in the surrender of sovereignty 
to the United States he could diminish any possible nationalist 
backlash.104 
 
Critics of the foundational negotiations claim that the Spanish negotiators were 
not well prepared for this type of bilateral negotiations with the US.  For example, the US 
was able to drive the content of the military agreements because of the lack of 
international experience of the negotiators.  At the heart of this agreement was the 
activation clause whereby US forces “would be allowed to activate or put in a state of 
alert the bases and military facilities in view of their use in armed conflict.”105   
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As for Spanish interests, General Franco set the economics and financial 
arrangements as the priority for the Spanish negotiators.  Franco relied on his Commerce 
Minister, Manuel Arburua; his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alberto Martin Artajo; and, 
his key strategic advisor, Admiral Blanco to ensure that the agreement were in Spain’s 
national interests.  At this level, the Spanish negotiators were able to gain considerable 
concessions and guarantees against US negotiators who bargained but hedged with their 
lack of control of the US Congressional budgetary process.106   
In January 1952, the negotiations dragged on as Truman replaced Griffis with 
Lincoln McVeagh.  The bulk of the negotiations were still in the hands of the US military 
but Truman continued to express his displeasure at the treatment of Protestants in Spain 
by the open discrimination of Protestant book burnings in Badajoz “and the subsequent 
arson at a British Protestant Church in Seville.”  Franco began to worry about the 
slowness of the negotiations and sent a “conciliatory letter to Truman in late 
February.”107  As the repression in Spain continued to overshadow the negotiations for 
the economic and military assistance, Franco looked to the 1952 US Presidential 
elections with anticipation.  Franco’s “hopes lay with the (US) Republicans, assuming 
that the favorite, Eisenhower, would regard him with considerably more sympathy than 
Truman.”108  
After Eisenhower was sworn in, the President replaced McVeagh with James C. 
Dunn, the former Ambassador to France.  On 9 April 1953, Dunn met with Franco and 
Martín Artajo expressing the President’s desire to finish the deal.  The settlement could 
have progressed more rapidly if not for Franco’s misconception fed by Artajo that the 
American had wanted the deal more than they did.  As the Americans threatened to 
abandon the agreement, Franco, through the military’s chief negotiator, Lieutenant 
General Juan Vigón, became forced to accept the deal and to adopt “what was virtually 
an American text.”109   
Finally, on 26 September 1953, the governments of the US and Spain signed the 
Pact of Madrid as a 10-year bilateral “executive agreement on defense – including 
ed between 1954 and 1960 though not made public until twenty-two secret clauses sign
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1981 – (authorizing) the USA to maintain and utilize military installations.”110  In this 
agreement, Franco allowed the US to build airbases at Torrejón de Ardoz,  Sanjurjo 
Valenzuela and Morón de le Frontera.  The US also built a naval base at Rota, Cadiz, a 
sophisticated radar system for air traffic control and an oil pipeline linking Rota with 
Zaragoza.111  By 1965, this arrangement contributed approximately $1.8 billion US 
dollars to the Spanish economy. 112  Because the US bore the cost of the upgrade to the 
Spanish military, Franco was able to devote large amounts of money for hydroelectric 
development and infrastructure advancements.   
The motivation behind this Spain’s entrance into this agreement seems evident.  
Franco looked to take advantage of the international and US perceptions towards the 
spread of communism.  Franco was also able to take advantage of the deal with the US by 
receiving military equipment from the US.   
While this equipment was not state of the art, the equipment provided a 
significant upgrade for the Spanish military.  US presence could also bring a certain level 
of stability to the region both internally and externally.  For the US, the “Franco model of 
deterrence” would dissuade the collective uprising from the vanquished left and 
externally, provide stability in “security scenarios in Northern Africa.”113 
In April 1954, the US congress amended the Mutual Security Act of 1951 to 
reflect the changes that spelled out the technical agreements between the two countries as 
well as its policies and distribution of funds to Spain and other European nations.114  The 
subsequent consultations between American economic advisors and Spain’s economic 
ministers led to the environment that made Spain’s inclusion into the Bretton Woods 
institutions possible.115  Franco declared to the Cortes that “he had not ceded any 
national sovereignty in the negotiations.”116  Franco, however, had not explained all of 
the technical agreements between the two nations.  In fact, wartime activations and 
                                                 
110 The US Congress also cites the agreement under the Mutual Security Act of 1954. Heywood. p. 
286, 3.2fn. 
111 Ibid.  
112 Payne (1967). p. 38. 
113 Viñas, A.  September 2003.  Negotiating the U.S.-Spanish Agreements, 1953-1988:  A Spanish 
Perspective.  Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 3. No. 7.  University of Miami. p. 4. 
114 US Department of Defense. 15 March 1954. Directive No. 2000.3.  “Technical Property 
Interchange Agreements.”    
115 Viñas. 2003. p. 4.  
116 Preston. p. 623. 
27 
military actions originating from Spanish territory with respect to Spanish sovereignty 
remained a point of contention that continued to surface during the 1963, 1968, 1976 and 
1981 negotiations.  
While the 1953 Pact of Madrid contained no guarantees for collective security, 
the US would provide protection in the event of a communist attack.  The US was under 
no obligation to intercede against any “non-communist aggressor.”117  The subsequent 
renegotiations 1963 did create a “Joint Consultative Committee to discuss mutual 
problems between the two countries.”118  Within this renewal was a clause that 
“specifically stated that any threat to Spain itself would be viewed as a matter of 
‘common concern’ by the United States Government.”119  
On emergency activation, the US only had to “communicate the information at its 
disposal and its intentions to the government of Spain.”120  The US also made clear to 
Spanish representatives that NATO was the primary focus for rearmament.  In effect, 
Spain became armed with the “equipment surplus to the general NATO arms build-up, 
weapons, aircraft and vehicles already used in the Second World War and/or Korea.”121 
Several US administrations utilized the technical agreements for activations of the 
US military during the Franco period of the Pact.  The Spanish administration allowed 
the activation of the bases in Spain during the 1958 Lebanon crisis.  Amid the Cuban 
missile crisis in 1962, however, the Kennedy Administration exercised the activation 
clause without complete consultation with the Spanish administration.  The Spanish 
government “did not know whether the crisis was taking place in the Caribbean or 
Berlin.”122 
The US also sought to establish “facilities to track nuclear explosions in 
the atmosphere and under sea, for setting up new radar facilities and, more 
importantly, for expanding the berthing facilities at Rota naval base.  The 
                                                 
117 “In the event of Communist aggression, or imminence thereof, which threatens the security of 
the West, U.S. forces may immediately make such use of agreed areas and facilities stipulated in this 
agreement as may be necessary for the defense of the West; provided that when the need for such use 
becomes apparent, the United States will immediately so inform the Spanish Government.  Should the 
United States wish to use the agreed areas and facilities for combat purposes as a result of the emergence of 
any other situation than above specified, such use will be subject to prior consultations between the two 
Governments.”  FRUS 1952-1954, vol. VI, doc. 885. 
118 Heywood. p. 38. 
119 Ibid. 
120  Ibid.  
121 Preston p. 623. 
122 Viñas. 2003. p. 22 
28 
idea was to introduce in Rota the modern submarines with the Polaris 
missiles.123 
 
By 1962, “NATO governments were not anxious to see Polaris missiles in their 
harbors or territories.”  The US military, however, eager for a solution, bypassed the 
political hierarchy and brokered a deal with a Spanish military official, Captain General 
Munoz Grandes.  “He saw no objection in granting the US request.  Spanish diplomats 
were neither consulted nor informed.”124   
A rapport developed between the US military and the Spanish military that had 
significant strategic consequences.  The US requested basing support in 1964 for actions 
in the Congo and the Spanish government supported the request.  The low point in the 
history of the bilateral relationship occurred in January 1966 when two US aircraft 
collided off the coast of Spain over the Mediterranean during a refueling mission of 
aircraft carrying nuclear ordnance.  One aircraft inadvertently jettisoned four H-Bombs 
near Palomares, Spain.  A diplomatic scandal emerged with an attempted military cover 
up.125  The US military justified the action through the belief that the technical 
agreements gave them the authorization to act unilaterally within the territory of Spain.  
On the basis of the working of the relevant arrangements 
concluded in the fifties, the United States saw no difficulty in introducing 
nuclear weapons into Spain and in extensively carrying out overflights of 
the Spanish territory with nuclear weapons.126  
   
Although Spanish diplomats sought to correct this during the 1968 negotiations 
concerning “Article VII of the 1953 (and secret) agreement,” a general inability of the 
Spanish bureaucracy prevailed that could not bridge the “rivalry between the civilian and 
military sectors of the Franco regime.”127  In September 1969, the US requested 
activation of Saragossa Air Base after Colonel Ghadafi’s coup in Libya.  Demonstrating 
the lack of cooperation between the Spanish political leadership and military, the Spanish 
government granted the request but failed to take advantage of their increased bargaining 
position with any future dealings with the US.  
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With a reinforced confidence in their leader, a corresponding change occurred 
with the Spanish military from 1953-1966, also.  While the military did not move to a 
centrist position, the military became increasingly “apolitical.”128  The armed forces 
became more “strictly professional” during this period.129  Ironically, the liberals that had 
denounced the military for their part in the 1936 Civil War, had by 1966, grown 
frustrated with the military for not having “any distinct political role among officers” that 
might bring an end to the Franco dictatorship.  In reality, a seemingly equitable power 
balance had formed between the military and other political elites.  Because Franco was 
able to develop and implement stronger state structures with funding and material support 
from the US, the military became confident in the ability of the political elites to guide 
the government.    
Domestically, the military remained loyal to Franco and his decision to reinstate 
the monarchy.  Because of the fact that Franco had approved of the Prince’s accession to 
the throne, His Majesty King Juan Carlos retained the support from the military and the 
right wing parties after Franco’s death in 1975.  The new king had to deal with the left’s 
assertions of being a puppet of the military and the right wing.  
However, the very fact that it was Juan Carlos himself who initiated 
proceedings in the transition to democracy ensured that there was never 
any real likelihood that the republican ambitions of the leftist opposition 
would be realized.130 
 
After the initiation of the democratic process by the King, three primary groups of 
Spanish elites emerge from the post-Franco regime from 1975-1982 that affected the 
initial development of the Spanish Constitution, European Community and NATO 
integration – the PSOE, the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) and the military.  The 
transformed PSOE was not the same institution that fled Spain after the civil war.  In 
September 1979, the PSOE dropped Marxism from its official party’s mandate to become 
more acceptable to the voting populace.131  The PSOE still clung to its basic desires for a 
Republic with more power to the autonomous regions, less influence of the Catholic 
Church in government and greater social freedoms. 
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From 1975-1981, the UCD developed from “the younger Falangists, Catholics out 
of government, and younger technocrats, civil servants and administrators,” leading the 
country through the initial transition period.132  The center UCD party, under the 
leadership of Adolfo Suárez, sought both NATO and EC integration as a means to 
improve Spain’s economy, increase Spain’s political status in Europe and continue its 
bilateral relations with the US.133 
The transitional period between the right-dominated Franco bureaucracies to the 
democratically elected transitional government sought to bring a balance between the 
increasing influence of the liberals in government and the vestiges of Franco’s regime.  In 
this change, the Spanish left began a systematic rejection of the symbols and structure of 
its authoritarian past.  Remaining, though, was the 1953 basing agreement with the US 
and accompanying technical agreements but negotiations between the Spanish and US 
diplomats indicated distinctive differences between the strategic preferences of the PSOE 
from the negotiated settlements of the Franco regime towards the Pact and its subsequent 
agreements.   
The military played a significant role in maintaining the Franco regime’s power 
through its repression of social uprisings.  The military became the guardians of the 
conservative movements because of its hatred for the communistic left and left’s threat 
against “traditional values” of Spanish conservatives.  During the time of Franco, the 
military preserved the conservative domination of the Franco regime because of the 
military’s perceptions of the liberal left’s political weakness and its support of 
communism.  After the democratic transition, the military ceased to be a concern once the 
government was able to dispel the concerns of the military over the direction of the 
Spanish democracy.    
This chapter provided an explanation of the dynamics between the conservative 
and liberal movements in Spain.  The following chapter demonstrates the differing styles 
of governance between the left and right that led Spain to its initial integration into 
Western defensive structures and finally into NATO.  The military also underwent a 
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III. SPANISH VIEWS ON NATO INTEGRATION FROM 1951 TO 
1996 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Strategic necessity and styles of governance play important roles in the 
development of Spain’s integration into the Western defense structures.  This chapter 
charts the development of the strategic necessity to include Spain into Western defense – 
first with a bilateral agreement with the US and later as a participating member of the 
Atlantic Alliance.  The purpose of this chapter is to uncover the motivation and thought 
processes of the Spanish elites that guided this integration to develop the strategic culture 
of Spain.   
Spain formally joined NATO in 1982 but the foundation of the Spanish 
integration and participation in Western defense structures began in 1951.  The signing of 
the agreement between Spain and the US administration led to military and economic 
cooperation through the 1953 Pact of Madrid.  The Pact, covered under the US 
Legislation under the Mutual Defense Act of 1954 and NSC-68, laid the foundation for 
Spain’s eventual NATO integration.   
The development of the bilateral relationship between Spain and the US during 
this period underscores how strategic necessity overrode the moral indignation of 
Franco’s authoritarianism.  Because of the bilateral relationship with the US, Franco was 
able to strengthen his regime allowing him to remain in control of Spain until his death in 
1975.  The subsequent political backlash against the Spanish right in the Post-Franco 
transition defined how the new Spanish government would seek NATO integration in 
1981-1982.  NATO integration ultimately helped to resolve the question of civil control 
over the military and provided a key insight on the political flexibility that the PSOE 
demonstrated during the negotiations.  This chapter will also discuss the role of the 
monarchy in quieting the military’s concerns over the perceived political weakness of the 
Spanish government.   
B. POST FRANCO NEGOTIATIONS 
The greatest change in the bilateral relationship between the US and Spain 
occurred when Franco died on 20 November 1975 and Juan Carlos assumed the throne on 
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22 November.  Initially, King Juan Carlos proposed no significant changes for the 
direction of the transition for change and swore in Carlos Arias Navarro as Prime 
Minister.134  Navarro was a loyal Francoist but was “torn between” maintaining the 
authoritarian government and reforming a government suitable to the liberals that sought 
liberal change.  As a result, Navarro failed to institute any significant reforms while 
failing to satisfy the right’s demands for the governmental status quo.  In effect,  
Navarro’s position reflected the dilemma affecting the entire regime.  
Whilst personally committed to the purpose and values of the reactionary 
Franco regime, Arias (Navarro) was…aware – in the light of growing 
pressure from an evermore confident opposition – of the need for some 
form of change.135 
 
In the matter of maintaining the authoritarian government or reformation, King 
Juan Carlos set the tone for the transformation by announcing to the US Congress during 
a state visit on 2 June 1976 of his intentions to introduce democracy to Spain.136  Because 
of Navarro’s “hapless” leadership, the King replaced Navarro with Adolfo Suárez after 
Navarro’s “forced” resignation on 1 July 1976.  As a political insider, Suárez was able to 
influence other members of Franco’s Movimiento Nacional party and was able to develop 
the transitional Law of Political Reform that paved the way for the development of a 
constitution.137     
The Spanish elites also became interested in redefining the bilateral relationship 
with the US.  In 1976, the UCD negotiated the withdrawal of the Polaris missiles and 
submarines from Rota and elevated the executive agreements with the US to the status of 
a treaty.138  This political recognition of the constitutional monarchy set the stage for 
subsequent bilateral negotiations with the US. 
With the newfound political confidence, the Spanish government was able to 
develop a foundation for substantive domestic reforms.  Because of the pluralistic 
composition of the Constitutional Committee of the Congress, the Spanish elites 
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established specific legislation that allowed for the development of a Constitution in 1978 
with free elections by 1979.139  In 1980, the UCD also sought to join NATO.140 
Understanding the political change in the relationship between the US and Spain, 
the UCD entered the 1981-1982 negotiations ambitiously in attempting “to restrict to the 
maximum extent possible the large margins of maneuver that the United States enjoyed 
in using the bases and facilities.”141  Still, the new Spanish government remained 
politically weak and became compelled to downgrade the “legal basis of the relationship 
to the level of executive agreements once again.”142  In spite of this, the 1982 agreement 
demonstrated that the new Spanish democracy had a fundamentally new “institutional 
arrangement for the US forces in Spain” and that the foundation existed for Spanish 
inclusion into the Atlantic Alliance.143 
In 1981, integration into NATO was seen as a priority for the new government 
under Prime Minister Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo to gain control of the military and gain 
“greater respect for democracy within an army renowned for its propensity to interfere in 
domestic politics.”144  The Spanish political elites had a tense relationship towards the 
military leading directly to the desire to join NATO.  In effect, NATO membership 
became a means to restructure and control the military, in particular the Army.  Another 
factor influencing the decision to join NATO was the hope to modernize the Spanish 
forces under a more western model.  Modernization resulted in the restructuring of 
Spanish forces under civilian control, modernizing equipment and updating doctrine to 
come in line with NATO standards.   
By 1982, NATO integration became problematic.  While the desire to reintegrate 
into the European Community was widely popular, integration into NATO became 
challenging because integration into the Atlantic Alliance was of secondary importance 
to the PSOE.  Because of now public documents showing Franco’s ties with the US, 
many Spaniards from the left viewed the US and subsequently NATO with contempt.  
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The Socialists were apprehensive of the US because of the US’s support for Franco since 
1953 with money and equipment from the basing rights.145   
Moreover, the Spanish left did not trust the US due to its “interventionist policies 
in Latin America.”146  The UCD, however, maintained its stance to integrate into both the 
EC and NATO.  This stance provided a political opportunity for the PSOE in the 1982 
general elections.  To illustrate this point, “Opinion polls in late 1981 showed 44 per cent 
of the population opposed (NATO) membership, with just 14 per cent in favor.”147 
C. NATO REFERENDUM  
While the UCD completed its accession talks with NATO in May 1982, the PSOE 
politicized the decision by promising a referendum concerning the issue of NATO 
membership if elected to office.  The PSOE, instead, preferred a bilateral security 
relationship with the US with a negotiated agreement to draw down the presence of the 
US in Spain.148  This stance provided the catalyst for an overwhelming victory for the 
PSOE and Felipe González during the October 1982 elections.  The European 
Community members of NATO placed pressure on the new government of Spain to 
remain within the Alliance.  As Paul Heywood points out though, “Felipe González soon 
discovered that the issue of NATO membership was inextricably linked to Spain’s 
application to join the EC.”149  Pressure from joint EC and NATO members explained to 
Spain that in order to benefit from the economic and political arrangements of the EC 
Spain would need to share the defense burden of full integration with NATO.150  In spite 
of this, Spanish elites remained united in their goal to integrate into the economic and 
political structures of the European Community.   
Before the October 1982 elections, the UCD negotiated the burden-sharing 
agreements with NATO.  After the elections, the new PSOE government decided to delay 
the decision for a referendum on NATO membership.  Domestically, NATO participation 
influenced the portioning of the limited Spanish defense spending.  The Air Force and 
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Navy received a significantly higher budgetary apportionment because of their ability to 
integrate more readily into NATO operations and exercises.151 
Reversing their position on NATO membership, the PSOE ultimately sought 
NATO integration based on strategic interests of joining the EC rather than concerns over 
whether NATO membership would serve the Spanish national interests.  In other words, 
domestic and economic reality outweighed political concerns over NATO integration.  
Socialists maintained their fears of NATO’s ability to solve diplomatic or military 
problems over Gibraltar and Melilla or Ceuta in Morocco.  For Spanish diplomats, 
however, EC and NATO membership became a means to an end.  The decision to accept 
NATO membership arose from a pragmatic desire for the internal economic benefits and 
political development that could progress by their integration into the European 
Community.152     
Spain’s integration with Europe was necessary for economic modernization.  The 
PSOE government faced significant budget restrictions during the transitional period and 
under the PSOE, the military budgets suffered.  For example, Spanish leadership decided 
that they would participate fully in NATO’s civil budget and military budget but did not 
participate in any infrastructure program until 1994.  Similarly, Spain did not plan to 
participate in the NATO Security and Investment Program (NSIP) until 1999.153   
Because of this desire for EC integration, the PSOE shifted its policy stance more 
in line with the UCD concerning NATO integration.  In the post election period, 
González reversed the PSOE position on NATO integration.  To the new Spanish 
government, EC membership was the means for economic stability for the nation but 
when the EC leadership linked NATO membership with EC membership, the integration 
into the EC became more important to the Spanish political leadership than the desire to 
remain separate from NATO.  Nonetheless, as per the election promise in 1982, Spain 
froze its participation with NATO and withdrew its delegates from NATO planning.154   
As the internal debate ensued, the question concerning a referendum became 
increasingly politicized.  While the UCD had originally wanted NATO integration, the 
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PSOE’s new position went against public sentiment in which only 14% of Spanish 
citizens’ favored NATO integration.155  The PSOE succeeded in delaying the vote while 
organizing a campaign in favor of joining NATO.  “At no point in the campaign did the 
government defend its pro-NATO position in terms of defense and security policy; 
instead, emphasis was placed on the potential political and economic costs if Spain were 
to say no to NATO.”156 
With the full support of the PSOE, the NATO referendum in Spain passed with a 
52.5% vote in favor, 39.8% against and 7.7% with blank or void votes.  Spain did 
maintain a measure of independence by establishing three criteria for further membership 
to NATO: 
1.  The participation of Spain in the Atlantic Alliance will not include its 
incorporation into the integrated military structure. 
2.   The prohibition of the installation, storing or introduction of nuclear 
arms on Spanish territory will be continued. 
3. The progressive reduction of the military presence in Spain of the 
United States of America will proceed.157 
 
Spanish elites quickly matured politically into guarded integrationists with NATO 
by seeking to place limits on Spain’s material support of NATO.  Because of its desire to 
distance itself from the UCD’s agreements with NATO, the PSOE, however, initially 
sought to limit the fiscal and political support that Spain gave to the Alliance.  One 
explanation for Spanish alignment away from the US and subsequently NATO, according 
to Michael González of the Wall Street Journal Europe, the PSOE ties with the socialist 
France influenced many of Spain’s integration decisions.  Spanish foreign policy became 
synchronized with the French in the early 1980s. 158  This led to an increase in the 
PSOE’s support of security and defense missions of uniquely European international 
organization such as the Western European Union (WEU) and the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  Through this, the PSOE still maintained its 
relationship with the US but limited its support to NATO.  
Domestically, conscription became a main source of contention with a high rate 
.  The governments of the PSOE instituted civil service of absenteeism and desertion
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options as a substitute for military service but this action still did not contribute to a 
greater desire to serve the government.  The military had become a reminder of the times 
of Franco and the Spanish people did not desire to remain associated with this legacy.  
Consequently, government began to find excuses for not sending deserting conscripts to 
jail and thus, the transformation of the military began through conscript accessions.  As 
conscripts left the military, the political leadership was both unable and unwilling to 
replace them on a one-for-one basis.  Illustrating this point are the statistics from 1980 
that show 3.1% (356K) of Spaniards were a part of the military either civil or military 
personnel.  This number decreased from 2.7% in 1985 to 2.1% in 1990.  Through this 
trend, by 1995, the number of Spaniards serving in the military as civilians or armed 
forces had decreased to 1.7% (210K).159  
D. DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL 
ELITES    
The Spanish transition to democracy was relatively peaceful but not without 
internal instability.  “The Spanish transition is unique in terms of the military’s secondary 
role, the low level of violence, the degree of agreement among the transition’s 
protagonists, and a mechanism of transition based on a monarchy.”160  However, “Spain 
is the European country that experienced the second largest volume of right radical and 
neofascist terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s, but right radical politics overall had 
been much weaker in Spain.”161  Left wing violence had a much more destabilizing effect 
on Spanish politics.  The spike in terrorist activities from Euskuadiko Ta Askatasuna 
(ETA) from 1975-1981 caused the ultra conservative members within the military to 
question the direction of the government that gave progressively more autonomy to the 
regions.  The perceived political weakness of the transitional government and the 
inability of the monarchy and government to handle internal disputes and terrorism 
partially explain the motivation behind the military coup on 23 February 1981.   
Within the military remained a hard-line, conservative group that, while in the 
minority, vocalized dissent over the new policies with respect to the handling of internal 
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problems of terrorism from Basque separatists and internal disturbances of strikes and 
demonstrations against the government.  Because of this dissatisfaction with the direction 
and the pace of democratic transition, this core group of officers organized and planned a 
military coup in 1978 and eventually a coup attempt in 1981.  The influence of the King, 
however, kept the majority of the officers from responding similarly. 
This moment of crisis allowed the government to handle the situation with great 
effectiveness.  “The king and his entourage, kept themselves busy on the phone, 
dispelling any impression that the military action had any royal support.”162  
Additionally, the king  
Appeared on the screen dressed in his uniform of captain general 
and said:  I have issued the following order to all captain generals of 
military regions, naval zones and air regions:  in the face of this situation 
created by the events in the Palace of Congress, and to avoid any possible 
confusion, I confirm that I have ordered civilian authorities and the Joint 
Chiefs, to take necessary measures to maintain the constitutional order 
within the existing laws…the Crown, symbol of the unity and permanence 
of the Fatherland, cannot in any way tolerate actions or attitudes of 
persons which the Constitution approved by the Spanish people 
determined in referendum.163 
  
With the challenge to the constitution handled, the military followed the 
leadership of the king and the military ceased to be a distraction to the political processes 
of the state.  In fact, the striking point of the debate over the NATO referendum from 
1982-1986 was the lack of military involvement and the lack of real influence that the 
military leadership gave towards this defining moment.  The role of military during the 
initial NATO integration was determined by three primary factors:  ideological 
differences between the individual Spanish forces, replacement of hard-line influences 
over the military forces and the legitimacy that the King Juan Carlos gave the democratic 
transition.  
The lack of influence resulted from the divergent views of the individual forces.  
While the Navy and the Air Force had more exposure and practical experience in dealing 
with NATO operating procedures through joint exercises, the Army was deeply 
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concerned over the perceived “liberal ideological features of most NATO members.”164  
The Army did not like the perceived political orientation of NATO’s European left.  The 
result was no unified voice for the direction for the Spanish armed forces. 
Additionally, as the hard-liners lost influence after the coup attempt, the focus of 
military changed.  From 1936 until 1975, the military had been used primarily to suppress 
the population.  Because Spain had fought only one territorial war in the 20th Century in 
Morocco, much of the focus of the military was on internal stability.  The regional 
organization of the regiments also contributed to this dominating military presence.165  
Upon integration into NATO, the defense forces had a new preoccupation with 
integration into the Western defensive structures and military exercises.166 
During the transition from the dictatorship, the military followed the King’s 
demands to maintain the democratic process.  The King gave the political elites 
legitimacy because of their adherence to a popular consensus on first the issues of 
governmental reform and second, through constitutional development.167    
Besides military intervention into civil affairs, another key carryover from the 
Franco regime is in the strategic preference of Spanish elites is to develop strong 
alliances with its historic allies.  For the UCD, the alliance with the US drove Spain’s 
initial integration into NATO.  By understanding this motivation towards security related 
topics, Spain’s decisions to support the use of its military for security and defense 
operations become clearer.  The UCD maintained the Franco allegiance with the US 
because of the United States’ strategic support since 1953.  The US provided much 
needed infrastructural assistance and military modernization during the later portion of 
the Franco regime.  Once the political situation matured, the US supported Spain’s 
NATO integration.   
In contrast, the PSOE believes that the historical alliance and integration priority 
belongs with the European Community rather than the US because of the economic and 
political integration that took place during the 1980s.  One explanation comes from 
Spain’s place in the European Community.  The Spanish diplomats during the socialist 
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government of Felipe Gonzalez maintained a pro-French orientation.168  According to 
Fernando Mansito, Representative Adjunct of Spain to the Political Security Committee 
to the European Union, Spain sought European integration because of economic and 
political necessity.  “It is quite natural that we maintained a pro-French position during 
the early years of transition...we had no choice.  Spain needed the economic benefits of 
integration into the EU.” 169  The need for economic integration drove a philosophical 
orientation away from NATO and towards the EC. 
In light of this philosophical orientation towards Europe, the PSOE also sought to 
renegotiate the bilateral pact with the US on more equal footing.  For the US, the 
agreement was more military than political.  For the Spanish, the Pact became a focal 
point for political reevaluation.  In stark contrast to the UCD’s negotiation style, Felipe 
Gonzalez set the tone for the PSOE’s discussions with the US by stating,  
We should not be surprised that those defeated in the civil war and the 
democratic opposition in general should have viewed these treaties as 
American support for the dictatorship and a blow for the hopes of a rapid 
democratic restoration in Spain.170   
 
Responding to this rhetoric, the US Secretary of State George Shultz responded 
by indicating “that the United States was not used to staying where it was not wanted.  If 
the Spaniards gave the impression that they did not want the United States to stay in 
Spain, well then the United States would go.”171  Mr. González did not want the US to 
leave Spain or for Spain to abandon the bilateral relationship.  This “instinctive” rhetoric 
became a sign of the desire for the Spanish left to redefine the Spanish relationship with 
the US.  Moreover, the 1986-1988 negotiations of the bases Pact demonstrated a 
fundamental shift in the Spanish-US relationship.  The new agreement revolved around 
five key points:  the US and Spain would agree on  
a non-cosmetic but reasonable and flexible reduction of the US military in 
Spain…Adapt the contractual provisions to a new setting based upon 
mutual respect, sovereign equality of the two parties, and a fair burden-
sharing of the defense effort, resolutely discarding any shadow of 
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subordination to purely US interests…Reshape, to the greatest extent 
possible, the procedures and control systems of the authorizations to use 
the support facilities by the US forces…Separate the security and defense 
relationship from any other kind…Update the provisions relating to 
manpower and privileges, closing some of the gaps which had appeared in 
the implementation of the 1982 agreement.172 
 
Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Francisco Fernández Ordonez stated to Mr. 
Shultz, “What we want is a balanced relationship, not subordination.  We want a 
relationship between allies, we want a relationship between equals, we do not want a 
military overextension.”173 
Demonstrating Spain’s new resolve in this, when the US government requested on 
several occasions to activate the bases and airspace for operations within the 
Mediterranean, in 1986, the Spanish government refused to allow the US to activate its 
bases or use Spanish airspace for its attacks on Libya.  As a generalization, the PSOE 
would only allow airbases and airspace for use as a belligerent if the action were 
“undertaken in accordance with international law.”174 
Signifying its allegiance towards Europe, Spain joined the Western European 
Union in November 1987.175  Additionally, Spain signed a Defense Cooperation 
Agreement with the US on 1 December that brought about the PSOE’s goal of a bilateral 
relationship with the US on “equal footing.”176   
Equally as important for the Atlantic Alliance, NATO’s Committee on Defense 
Plans agreed on Spanish military contributions delineating Spain’s general support for 
NATO operations.177  One such commitment was the development of NATO’s Rapid 
Reaction Force that later became the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps 
(ARRC) in 1990-1991 under MC 317.178  Demonstrating the solidarity between the 
French and Spanish positions, the two countries became opposed to the development of 
the missions under which NATO could use the ARRC.  They became opposed not on the 
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structural elements of the force but on the political nature of the missions that the force 
could assume.   
It remained unclear whether the new forces could become engaged in ‘out-
of-area’ operations.  Some NATO countries were concerned that the 
IMS’s (International Military Staff) proposals were going too far in 
restructuring NATO forces and in implying a future ‘out-of-area’ role for 
the Alliance.  French and Spanish officials saw in the development of the 
ARRC an attempt by the British and the United States to use the Alliance 
for their own ‘out-of-area’ operations and thus reassert their dominance 
with the organisation.179 
 
From the US standpoint, a key point of the PSOE’s shift in foreign policy was the 
lessening of Spain’s reliance on the US defense industry for weapon systems.  Spain 
began curtailing its reliance on US weapon systems.   
Spain’s policy makers sought extensive involvement in European co-
production agreements.  Thus, the PSOE government committed itself to 
the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA) project along with Britain, Italy and 
Germany, a co-production agreement with France and Germany for the 
Roland missile system, as well as further projects with France, Italy and 
Greece for the development of a naval anti-aircraft missile, an electronic 
jamming system and a nuclear powered submarine.180 
 
From 1993-1995, the PSOE government came under scrutiny for scandals 
involving activities against ETA and subsequently lost its absolute majority in the Cortes.  
This weakness allowed the center-right Partido Popular (PP) to win more seats within 
the Parliament.  By late 1995, the PSOE-led coalition government became increasingly 
more favorable to full NATO integration.  In November 1995, the Parliament voted for 
full integration into NATO’s military structures.   
The transformation of the PSOE’s foreign policy coincided with the crisis within 
NATO itself over Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The shift in Spain’s commitment to NATO came 
as a corresponding shift developed in the perception of the PSOE’s position towards 
NATO integration.   
Highlighting this transformation, the liberal El Pais wrote in an editorial on July 
15, 1996 saying,  
Spain's non-military integration into NATO was somehow justified 10 
years ago.  What is now being contemplated is not the integration into a 
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military structure designed against the Soviet enemy during the Cold 
War...The NATO of 1996 does not only exist to carry out side-defense 
tasks but missions like the present one in the former Yugoslavia in which 
countries like Sweden and Russia take part under the command of 
NATO...They are not defense missions but missions of preservation and 
establishment of peace outside the usual umbrella of the Alliance...It 
would be absurd and counterproductive for Spain's interests if France were 
to normalize its participation in NATO, and countries like Poland or the 
Czech Republic were to integrate fully into this organization, while Spain 
remained in an uncomfortable position that would reduce its influence in 
collective decisions and make Spain's participation in new missions more 
difficult.181 
 
The change in world events necessitated Spain’s full integration into NATO 
structures by 1996.  During the transformation period, the Spanish right and the left 
moved closer to one another ideologically, but distinct strategic preferences remained.  
The right remained committed to US and NATO relationship while the left still preferred 
the OSCE and EU structures and integration.  The strategic preferences of the Left and 
Right again determined the reactions that the Spanish elites would have towards 
participation in US-led coalitions, NATO-led operations and EU-led crisis management 
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IV. PARTICIPATION AND SUPPORT OF NON-TERRITORIAL 
DEFENSE MISSIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the Spanish political will and attitudes towards supporting 
and participating in non-territorial defense missions.  The strategic motivation behind 
Spain’s support of non-territorial operations is the combination of the desire to maintain 
regional influence, demonstrate international responsibility and support friendly 
governments or alliances.  In critical periods during covering the Spanish democratic 
governments, Spanish administrations have supported non-territorial defense and security 
missions based on one or all of the above criteria.  Conversely, when operations went 
against the strategic interests of the Spanish governments, Spanish forces did not 
participate in non-territorial defense or security missions.  This chapter investigates how 
Spanish elites implement strategic initiatives into operational realities.      
This analysis deals primarily with the period from October 1982 to May 2004 but 
decisions whether or not to participate in non-territorial defense operations for the 
Spanish military are not a recent phenomenon.  During the World War II, the Franco 
regime allowed Spanish soldiers to support non-territorial defense missions.  In the post 
WW II era, Franco again offered to send forces to help its allies.  The initial portion of 
this chapter will examine the motivations and attitudes of the Franco regime to discern 
any strategic preferences that still apply to Spanish political elites.  In addition, with the 
election of the PSOE in 1982, Spain’s views on military employment shifted to regional 
defense with European integration and European defense structures.  Through this 
transformation of the country into a democracy, Spain continued to maintain solid 
bilateral relations with the US.  Because of Spain’s commitment to international and 
coalition operations, Spain supported numerous UN, NATO and coalition operations in 
Iraq in 1991, in the Balkans and Africa in the 1990s, coalition operations in Afghanistan 
in 2002 and finally coalition operations in Iraq in 2004.   
In defining Spanish elite’s rational for non-territorial defense and security 
missions, Franco believed in reciprocating support for Spain’s allies outside of Spain but 
not at the expense of Spanish national interests.  After the Spanish Civil War, Spain’s 
47 
foreign policy centered on the dynamic political relationship between Franco and Hitler 
and the economic and military necessity of receiving support from a foreign regime.  Had 
Hitler maintained its support for Franco during the course of the Spanish Civil War, 
Franco quite possibly would have entered the war on the side of the Germans and 
Italians.  Due to the perceived lack of strategic support from Hitler, Franco chose not to 
assist the Germans during the early portions of WW II.  Later, when Franco did offer the 
20,000 Falangists to the Germans, Franco was stemming a domestic power struggle 
within his government.  Similarly, Franco attempted to use the offer of Spanish support to 
the US for Korea in 1950 to influence Presidents Truman and Eisenhower to gain 
political and economic support for Spain through a bilateral agreement with the US. 
Critics of the 1953 Bases Pact express that Spain ceded a large measure of 
sovereignty in allowing a foreign military access to bases, airspace and ports without 
receiving sufficient political or military support in return.182  The alliance with the US 
allowed Franco to maintain his hold on Spain while bringing much needed infrastructure 
development to the country but the Pact did not help to solve other foreign policy 
problems of Spain.  By contrast, Franco neither asked nor received any support for 
political problems stemming from the Spanish protectorate in Morocco.  Neither the Pact 
with the US nor the military equipment that followed allowed Spain to maintain its 
claims on the Spanish protectorate in Morocco in April of 1956.183  In fact, the US 
“never made any bones about its intentions not to become embroiled in Spanish disputes 
with Morocco.”184  After 1963, Spain sought to renegotiate the bases pact with varying 
results but still maintained the relationship with the US because of the continued 
economic and military benefits to Spain.  Key in this analysis is that the Franco 
government supported the allies that offered strategic assistance that helped develop the 
national interests of Spain.  In this case, Franco himself defined the national interest of 
Spain.  
While Spain did not participate in any security or defense missions outside of its 
territory from 1956-1986, the conditions of the Pact allowed the US to operate within the 
ease.  Once the unabated operations of the US became Mediterranean with relative 
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controversial, a shift in the relationship between the US and Spain began to develop 
through the renegotiations of the Pact under first the UCD and later the PSOE after 1982. 
B. 1982-1996:  MAINTAINING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH 
THE US WHILE INTEGRATING WITH EUROPE 
After 1982, integration into the EC economic and political institutions took 
priority over NATO integration.  Subsequently, the PSOE directed much of its energy 
towards the development of regional institutions such as the Western European Union 
(WEU), the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (later the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe) and the European Corps (EUROCORPS).   
Following a French model of international security orientation, the PSOE wanted 
to create more European options for security apart from a dependence on the US and 
NATO.  On 23 October 1984, the PSOE published its strategic direction for foreign 
policy with respect to security operations.  Below is the stated “Decalogue on Spain’s 
peace and security role” that followed a balanced security policy maintaining Spain’s 
bilateral relationship with the US but kept NATO integration limited.185   
1.  Continued Spanish membership of NATO. 
2.  Non-incorporation into NATO’s military structure. 
3.  A change in the bilateral relations with the United States of America 
towards a gradual reduction in the presence of American forces and 
installations on Spanish soil. 
4.  The non-nuclearisation of Spain. 
5.  Possible signing of the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation. 
6. The desirability of joining the Western European Union as the only 
European organization with defense capabilities. 
7.  Moves towards a definitive resolution of the Gibraltar issue. 
8.  The strengthening of Spain’s role within the European Disarmament 
Conference and application for membership of the Disarmament 
Committee of the United Nations. 
9.  The continued development of a network of bilateral agreements on 
defense cooperation with other west European nations. 
10. Dialogue between political forces to achieve agreement on a joint 
strategic plan.186 
 
While Spain eventually committed to full NATO participation, Spanish elites 
would not set a specific timeline for the full integration.187  Spain oriented its foreign 
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policy towards its southern flank and this policy did not correspond directly to NATO’s 
direction towards the East and the Soviet Union.  The PSOE’s security orientation has 
consistently remained to the South in the Mediterranean and Northern Africa.  Because of 
this orientation, “Spanish policy makers identified the CSCE, rather than NATO, as the 
most appropriate forum for debating security in Europe and the Mediterranean.”188 
Seeking to “formalize” its foreign policy, Spain joined the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty on 5 November 1988 and became an “active observer in the WEU on 
14 November 1988.”189  “Spanish membership was ratified by the Cortes in March 1990, 
but only after severe criticism by the WEU Assembly of Spain’s ambiguous position in 
respect of European defense commitments.”190  
1. The 1991 Gulf War  
The first test of the Spanish foreign policy, however, came with the first Gulf War 
crisis from 1990-1991.  As Spain sought to fulfill its international obligation through 
military support of the coalition, the Spanish population was against any out-of-area 
action for Spanish soldiers.191  After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PSOE looked 
to coordinate its foreign policy with its European Community allies by supporting the 
WEU to support EC actions.  During the initial stages of the coalition buildup to the 
conflict, the UN had not yet issued a resolution to legitimize coalition actions.  
Additionally, technical problems under international law remained unresolved for Spain 
to support US and coalition forces operating against Iraq in 1990-1991.  Subsequently, 
during the first days of the crisis, support for coalition operations from the territory of 
Spain was not guaranteed by the PSOE.   
In the end, “Spain did not hesitate in providing political, logistical and intelligence 
support.  It was not a unilateral U.S. decision but an action undertaken in accordance with 
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international law.”192  In this same vein, Spain established three criteria for supporting 
the gulf conflict. 
First, in line with a decision adopted at a WEU ministerial meeting on 21 
August 1990, a small-scale military contribution was made:  three 
warships – a frigate and two corvettes – were sent to the gulf…Second, 
logistical support was offered to various countries, notably the USA, but 
also France, the UK and Turkey.  Of particular importance was the use of 
the Spanish air bases:  35 percent of the total US air deployment operated 
via Spain, including over 300 missions by B-52 bombers flying out of 
Moron de la Frontera…Third, the Spanish government insisted that its 
forces in the Gulf would not enter direct combat, and also that it would not 
send ground troops.193   
 
“Nevertheless, rights were made available when the deployment began, in part 
owed to previous US security relations with these states, including security assistance 
programs, and the quick actions of State Department officials.”194   
In reality, the level of support ranged from the basing support at Spanish air bases in 
Moron, Zaragoza and Torrejón to the port support in Rota as a refuel and supply point for 
ships continuing into the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf.  As an example of support, the US 
was able to operate 22 B-52Gs supporting over 5000 sorties from Moron.195  Because of the 
strategic airlift and aerial refueling originating from Moron, the US was also able to support a 
Contingency Intermediate Level Maintenance Center (CILMC) in Moron that provided “full 
avionics and intermediate-level maintenance capabilities.”196   
Examples of the technical issues impeding support from the Spaniards were the 
problems relating to international law.  If Spain allowed the US or coalition aircraft to 
take off from Spain and bomb Iraq, Spain would become an active belligerent of the 
conflict. The PSOE did not want Spain to become an active belligerent in the war because 
the Spanish government had not yet informed its population that they were supporting the 
buildup of combat forces transiting to the Persian Gulf and Spain wanted to maintain 
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good relationships with the “Maghreb countries.”197  Spanish elites set the requirement 
that the aircraft departing from Spanish airbases with the intent to bomb Iraq would take 
off from Spanish airbases with the weapons aboard the aircraft unarmed.198  The US was 
able to resolve the issue by assuring the Spaniards that the weapons would depart from 
Spain unarmed and that the weapons would only be armed in international airspace.199   
Technical issues of support became important because the bulk of the support 
from Spain came from basing arrangements at airfields or ports.  Spanish assistance was 
critical from Rota.200  Rota became a major hub for forces transiting from the US to the 
Persian Gulf.  Rota also became a critical as a repair facility for US Naval shipping.  The 
FSS Antares broke down during transit from the US.  Instead of towing the ship back to 
the US, the ship was taken to Rota to have its boilers repaired.  Because of the combined 
ability to airlift and sealift its remaining cargo and personnel to the Persian Gulf from 
Rota, the loss of combat capability remained minimal.   
Spanish naval ships were also a vital member in the Maritime Interception Force 
(MIF) that conducted operations in the Red Sea, Gulf of Oman and the Strait of Hormuz.  
While supporting this operation with a Spanish frigate, Corvettes, and supply ship, Spanish 
forces contributed to the security of maritime operations within the region.  
Spanish elites remained uneasy about the domestic effects of the war from a practical 
standpoint.  As Persian Gulf operations increased, the fuel requirements began to increase 
correspondingly.  The Spanish fuel pipeline was unable to meet the demand.   
Fuel consumption in Spain increased 300 percent from peacetime rates.  
This resulted in a demand on the Spanish-owned pipeline system, which 
provides resupply to US bases and the Spanish private sector that could 
not be met. USAFE officials negotiated with Spanish authorities and 
augmented fuel deliveries with tank trucks.  At one time, as many as 60 
tank trucks were delivering jet fuel, some of which came from refineries 
several hundred miles away.  Additional mission requirements prompted a 
request by US officials for more fuel.  Based on this request more Spanish 
pipeline time was made available for fuel deliveries at the expense of civil 
requirements.201 
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During the first Gulf War, strategic and political assistance from Spain was a 
critical part of the success in the operations.  Because of Spain’s commitment to share the 
burden of international security, Spain became a non-permanent member of the UN 
Security Council in October 1992.202  
2. Bosnia  
As operations in the Persian Gulf still dominated political attention, the Bosnian 
crisis developed into a humanitarian disaster.  Initially, the EC looked to engage the 
problem as a European matter without the assistance of NATO.  Spanish forces 
participated in the former Yugoslavia in October 1992 by sending 750 troops as part of 
the UN peacekeeping force.203  When the EC and UN became unable to effect change in 
the security problems in the Balkans, the PSOE began to seek a greater role for Spanish 
forces within a transformed NATO.  This desire to have greater decision-making 
capability with respect to security missions outside of the territory of Spain became 
readily apparent with the decision to seek further NATO integration in 1995.   
The PSOE continually needed to balance the ability to exert force outside of the 
territory of Spain with the negative public opinion that developed due to its operational 
commitments.  Because of the initial negative public sentiment towards a NATO led 
operation in Bosnia, “Spain resisted NATO pressure to send an entire Brigade – up to 
5000 men – to Bosnia in preparation for possible armed intervention of UN forces.”204  
Because of Spanish public opinion, the PSOE was not convinced that NATO should 
undertake peacekeeping missions.   
In response to ally concerns over NATO’s capability to execute peacekeeping 
operations and the ability to maintain the international legitimacy through military 
actions, the US and the EC began pushing for “interlocking of institutions” to perform 
peacekeeping activities.205  The EC sought a greater role for the WEU as well as 
developing a mission to assist the CSCE.  As the US sought to support the Atlantic 
Alliance in the peacekeeping role, NATO and the WEU worked to help the “CSCE 
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strengthen its crisis management mechanisms.”206  Spain aligned its foreign policies with 
those of Germany, France and Belgium in expressing that NATO should not seek to 
expand its mandate to peacekeeping and “out-of-area operations.”207 
Additionally, by 15 May 1995, Spain along with France and Italy “announced the 
formation of the European (Rapid Deployment) Force (EUROFOR) and the European 
Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR).”208  The crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrated 
that Spain could contribute to the Alliance and the Western European Union obligations 
during Operation SHARP GUARD and MARITIME GUARD from 15 Jun 93 to 19 Jun 
96.  In spite of a public sentiment against operations outside of the territory of Spain, 
Spanish participation in the Adriatic included two Frigates and a P-3B in support for 
maritime operations. 
Because of the success of Spanish support within the framework of the Alliance, 
Spanish elites recognized that Spain could play a larger role in NATO and European 
defense and crisis management operations.  The key obstacle for Spain, however, was the 
lack of a professional force and modern equipment in the military.  The need for 
precision ordnance and compatible command and control equipment during Operation 
DELIBERATE FORCE helped compel Spain to begin defense modernization programs.   
In spite of the technological obstacles, Spanish aviators were able to integrate into 
the aviation planning and operational structures at Aviono, Italy to participate in the 
combat operations with Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) missions, close air 
support (CAS) missions and other combat service support missions.  Spain contributed to 
this NATO led operation with 8 EF-18A, 2 KC-130 and 1 CASA-12 but flew only 3.4% 
of all sorties flow during the combat operations from 29 Aug 95 to 14 Sep 95.209  After 
the Dayton Peace Accord, Spain continued its support for the NATO-led Implementation 
Force (IFOR) and the Stabilization Force (SFOR). 
Spain eventually sent a Mechanized Infantry Brigade Headquarters and two 
Infantry Battalions under the SFOR Multinational Division South East Command in the 
French and German sector.  Additionally, Spain provided an Engineer Company and an 
                                                 
206 Ibid. 
207 Bono. pp. 51-52. 
208 Ibid. 96-97. 
54 
209 NATO - Allied Forces Southern Europe – Fact Sheet.  Summary of Operations – Operation 
DELIBERATE FORCE.   
Engineer Battalion for support operations.210  King Juan Carlos approved of Spain’s 
increased commitment to international security via NATO in an address to the North 
Atlantic Council in April of 1996, 
The implementation of the Peace Plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina through 
IFOR proves beyond any doubt the irreplaceable role that NATO is able to 
play, as it effectively combines the North American and European efforts.  
In this respect, I should once again like to pay my most sincere tribute 
from here to all those men and women who, first with UNPROFOR and 
later in the IFOR framework, have devoted their efforts, sometimes at the 
very high cost of their lives, to achieving a lasting peace in the former 
Yugoslavia.211  
         
 Following the Socialist’s defeat in the 1996 general elections, the new 
Spanish President José Maria Aznar set the tone for the Partido Popular (PP) providing 
no major shift in Spain’s support or orientation towards NATO or the EC security 
structures.  In his first parliamentary meeting after the elections, President Aznar stated 
that his key priorities were Spain’s strategic relationship with Europe and the economic 
state of the regions of Spain.212 
D. TRANSITION OF POWER AND THE SHIFT IN SPANISH FOREIGN 
POLICY – KOSOVO, AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ 
While the first Aznar administration policies were clearly oriented on domestic 
concerns, Operations in Kosovo in 1999 provided the first opportunity for the new 
government to demonstrate its resolve in supporting additional international 
commitments.  President Aznar committed four F/A-18As and a C-130 aircraft to the 
NATO-led operation against Slobadan Milosevic in the March 1999 operations.213  
Following the UN approved peace plan, the Aznar government committed 1300 ground 
personnel (4 Infantry Convoy, 1 Cavalry Squadron) to the Serbia & Montenegro Kosovo 
Force (KFOR).214    
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 After the 2000 general elections, the PP won an absolute majority in the Cortes 
allowing Aznar’s foreign policy to accept the “growing responsibilities both with NATO 
framework and regarding Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.”215  Internally, 
Aznar abolished conscription, which removed a major obstacle for the deployment of 
Spanish troops abroad.  Seemingly, however, political rivalries within the EU created the 
environment for the Spanish administration to favor support from the US administration 
over the EU.  Member states of the EU were either unwilling or unable to assist Spain in 
solving diplomatic issues with Morocco and internal security problems of ETA that led 
Spain to seek US support.  
Spanish elites defined their international obligations in terms of providing support 
to the countries that reciprocate with military, political and economic support.  Mr. 
Mansito declared, “We are going to help the countries that help us.  For example, the US 
helped us with the political problems with Morocco and our security problems with ETA.  
Because of that help, when the US had a problem, we reacted practically to that 
problem.”216   
Demonstrating this point were the actions of the US Secretary of State Colin 
Powell, in interceding with the governments of Morocco and Spain in July 2002 over the 
Spanish Island of Perejil to solve a diplomatic dispute over Moroccan forces inhabiting 
the island.  According to CNN, “Powell made about 30 phone calls to (Spanish Foreign 
Minister) Palacio and King Mohamed VI of Morocco as well as the foreign ministers of 
Morocco and Spain over the last two to three days.”217  As a result, the Moroccans left 
the island, and Morocco and Spain normalized their diplomatic relations.  
Similarly, as Ambassador George L. Argyros, US Ambassador to Spain, 
explained,  
Spain’s own experience with ETA terrorism makes it a leading voice in 
the anti-terrorist coalition. The invigorated effort against terrorism since 
September 11 has helped the Spanish government in its efforts to rid Spain 
of ETA terror. When the US Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill recently 
announced the names of 21 etarras whose financial assets we would 
freeze, it sent a signal to the whole world that the U.S. would stand “side 
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by side” with Spain in her fight, as President Bush pledged in Madrid in 
June 2001.218  
 
Notably, the US pledge for assistance with help with ETA came before the 
September 2001 attacks on the US and demonstrated a unified effort to combat internal 
and external terrorism prior to the swell of international support after 2001 against 
international terrorism.   
Conversely, the inability or unwillingness of EU member states to help the PP 
with combating terrorism and intrastate problems prior to September 2001 set the tone for 
Spanish support for EU initiatives.  Internal rivalries between individual EU member 
states still matter within the context of European Union security and defense policy.  
Illustrating this point, John Vinocur of the International Herald Tribune, in October 2003 
wrote as follows: 
To understand Europe after Iraq, said Ramón Gil-Casares, the Spanish 
secretary of state for foreign affairs, requires recognizing that the French-
German relationship remains very important in the European Union's 
approach to economic affairs. At the same time, he said in an interview, 
"as far as foreign policy goes, the French-German axis is just not 
indispensable anymore. They cannot pretend it is, and they cannot speak 
for Europe.”219  
 
According to Aznar, Spanish foreign policy had been too reliant on French 
foreign policy by adopting security policies similar to the French with respects to NATO 
and UN participation.  Through the 1980s and 1990s, Aznar also believed that “Spain had 
squandered great strategic opportunities through its absence in all the major international 
conflicts.”  September 11th, 2001 offered Spain an opportunity to demonstrate its strategic 
importance in the US-led operation in Afghanistan.  Representative of the increased 
support for NATO, Spain supported Operation Enduring Freedom with 1300 military and 
medical personnel and currently supports NATO’s follow-on International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) with 350 personnel.220  In the same manner that Spain became 
important with the first Gulf War, the bases and ports in Spanish territory gained the 
same strategic importance allowing the flow of military and logistical support for OEF 
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and ISAF operations.  In contrast to the first Gulf War, Spanish public support for the 
operations in Afghanistan remained favorable allowing for Spanish personnel to deploy 
in support of combat operations without much dissent. 
The PP also provided reciprocal diplomatic support to the US for Operation Iraqi 
Freedom because of the combination of the political support that the US gave to Spain in 
dealing with Morocco and ETA and Aznar’s strategic vision for Spain to have a greater 
influence in international affairs.  The Aznar administration felt compelled to support the 
US administration because of the assistance from the US in the prosecution of ETA 
separatists in spite of the growing public opinion against the actions of the coalition 
against Iraq.   
As for Spain’s relations with the EU, Spanish elites realized during the 
negotiations with the UN in 2003 that France did not want a strong and independent 
Spain that would challenge the French over the formation of the European Union foreign 
policy.221  As an example, only after September 11th, 2001 did the French government 
demonstrate the political will to assist Spain against the ETA activists living in Southern 
France.  Additionally, the French were unwilling to assist Spain with its political 
problems with Morocco because of the French concerns over damaging its historic 
relations with Algeria and Morocco.  In light of this lack of political support from 
member states of the EU, the Aznar administration shifted its support to a “US first 
policy option.”222  In response, the US gave Spain the continued and active assistance 
with both counter-terrorist operations against ETA and with the direct political 
intervention with Kingdom of Morocco, thereby insuring Spanish support for operations 
in Afghanistan, the North Arabian Ocean and Iraq.   
During the negotiations in the UN, Spain offered the US “unwavering support in 
the United Nations.”223  The PP supported the US viewpoint that UNSC Resolution 1441 
was sufficient justification for actions in Iraq.224  While not participating in the initial 
combat operations in Iraq, Spain eventually deployed 1300 ground personnel to Iraq as 
part of the Multinational Division in South Central Iraq.  Spain assumed a leadership role 
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in this area, leading the Spanish-speaking members of the coalition according to its 
mandate to provide security for the reconstruction effort in Iraq. 
E. MARCH 2004:  DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN SPAIN AND SHIFT IN 
FOREIGN POLICY 
In keeping an campaign promise and demonstrating a clear shift in Spanish 
foreign policy after the March 2004 elections, the PSOE President Zapatero pledged that 
unless the occupation in Iraq is supported politically and militarily by a resolution by the 
“UN or any other multinational organization,” Spain would withdraw its forces from Iraq.  
Originally, the pledge of Zapatero was to allow for negotiation of a UN resolution that 
would offer a greater level of legitimacy to the coalition operations by 30 June 2004 and 
only after that date would a Spanish withdrawal begin from Iraq.     
Two points led to Zapatero to hasten the withdrawal of the Spanish forces from 
Iraq.  According to Spanish Minister of Defense, José Bono, the first point was a lack of 
consultation from the US command with the coalition forces in Iraq and the second was 
the belief that the US would not allow the UN to assume a sufficient role that would 
legitimize the operations in Iraq.  According to General Jose Enrique de Ayala, second in 
command of the Spanish and Polish-led multinational division,  
‘the point of inflection’ came on April 1, in Najaf, the spiritual capital, 
where 200 Spanish soldiers were deployed at the time…the US command 
declared the movement that was headed by radical Shiite cleric Moktada 
al-Sadr ‘as hostile’ and order ‘large-scale offensive operations,’ resulting 
in the closure of his newspaper and, on April 3, the arrest of his lieutenant 
Mustapha al-Yuqubi…‘The arrest was carried out without us being 
consulted,’ Ayala said.  ‘If we would have been asked, we would have 
advised against it.’225  
     
According to Ayala, the Spanish forces were unprepared for an offensive mandate 
and the actions of the US leadership put the Spanish soldiers at risk.  The point of 
consultation resonated through the Multinational Division because few of the forces were 
equipped for offensive operations.  A report drafted by Ayala for the Polish command  
explained that his soldiers ‘are not an offensive force, our mandate was 
not to be one, our mission was to contribute to stabilization and 
reconstruction, and we lacked the resources to carry out an offensive 
strategy…The Spanish forces therefore became ‘witnesses to a conflict, 
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mute witnesses of a situation we could not understand and did not agree 
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After a meeting between Mr. Bono, the Spanish Minister of Defense, and Donald 
Rumsfeld, US Secretary of Defense, on 17 April 2004 that offered no change in the US 
position on UN authority in Iraq, Zapatero ordered his Minister of Defense to withdraw 
its forces from Iraq in the most expeditious manner.  According to Bono, “I asked 
Rumsfeld in the Pentagon if he would accept a military operation under the command of 
the United Nations…He answered:  ‘While I’m in this chair, a non-American commander 
will never command an American soldier.’”227  After additional consultation with the 
UK, Bono informed Zapatero that no UN resolution that would satisfy the PSOE would 
come from the UN and Zapatero ordered the early withdrawal of Spanish forces from 
Iraq.  The Spanish Minster of Defense later announced that the Spanish forces in Iraq 
would be back to Spain by 27 May 2004.228   
Spain’s decision to withdraw its forces led to a series of defections away from the 
US-led coalition that began to strain the other members of the coalition and the US.  
Spain’s withdrawal of its forces from the Multinational Division affected Honduras and 
the Dominican Republic who begin withdrawing their forces from Iraq in May 2004.   
In light of Spain’s withdrawal from Iraq, what is unclear is how Spain will 
demonstrate to the EU and NATO its commitment to international security.  Spanish 
leadership will need to contend with the perception that Spain withdrew its forces due 
submission to terrorist attacks in Madrid.  The PSOE is making clear public statements 
that Spain will remain a strong actor in the fight against terrorism but the new Spanish 
administration makes a clear distinction between the Global War on Terror and the 
operations in Iraq.229   Zapatero pledged the increase of Spanish force to Afghanistan 
while NATO has requested that Spain “assume control of Provincial Reconstruction 
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Team (RPT) in June 2004.”230  According to a PSOE spokesperson, NATO is asking 
Spain to assume a greater role in Afghanistan in light of its withdrawal from Iraq.  Spain 
is considering contributing “up to 300 soldiers to the European Union’s High Command, 
which includes troops from France, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg.”231  
Additionally, Spain is in line to assume control of the NATO’s ISAF mission from 
Canada.  While most of the forces sent to Afghanistan will most likely be used in security 
in Kabul, “the real task Spain confronts is taking command outside the capital.”232  By 
removing its forces from Iraq and restating its commitment to ISAF, the PSOE has made 
the clear statement that unless the UN or some other international organization 
legitimizes international involvement, Spain will not participate in security missions 
outside the territory of Spain. 
The following chapter looks at Spain’s integration into the European Security and 
Defense Policy. In general, understanding Spanish participation in EU and NATO 
defense and security force operations depends on considering how Spanish elites views 
its international obligations and how those obligations fit within its budgetary constraints 
and limitations.  NATO and ESDP remain intrinsically linked and Spain sees no need to 
change this arrangement.  Spain has a paradoxical relationship with the European Union.  
While Spanish elites see the need to increase integration with the EU, they also explain, 
“Spain cannot abandon its relationship with the US.”233  Spain has the opportunity to 
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V. ANALYSIS OF SPANISH INTEGRATION INTO EUROPEAN 
SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY 
 
 
                                                
A. INTRODUCTION 
As Julian Lindley-French, Director of the European Security Policy Training 
Course at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy explains, “European defense is less 
about defense and more about politics.”234  This chapter develops how Spain views its 
role in the greater scheme of the European Union’s security and defense efforts and 
demonstrates how this role meshes within the scope of ESDP and NATO.  This chapter 
also demonstrates that political rivalries matter within the scope of EU defense, this 
chapter also explains that Spanish strategic culture creates an environment that offers a 
bridge between the EU of 15 and the new EU of 25 member-states, and that Spain 
promotes strong relations between the expanded EU within both NATO and the US.   
The need for further integration with the EU drives Spanish participation in 
ESDP.  This participation is broken down into operational, industrial and economic 
implications that tie in the need to understand how this involvement plays into Spanish 
domestic politics.  Additionally, this chapter develops Spanish integration into the EU’s 
crisis management capability, including its commitment to improve the EU’s defense 
capabilities and defense and industrial cooperation with a coordinated European 
industrial effort.  In the end, however, this chapter will show that Spanish strategic 
culture leads Spain’s elites to make pragmatic choices with regard to security and defense 
based on national interests rather than parochial decisions that rely on purely EU 
integrationist or pro-US positions.  Spain’s incorporation into ESDP depends on Spain’s 
defense industrial cooperation into European structures, modernization of its forces and 
further participation into EU-led crisis management and defense missions. 
For full participation in NATO operations and EU crisis management operations, 
President Aznar began to transition Spanish forces into a professional military in 1996.  
The cost of this transformation is still a major factor inhibiting the modernization of the 
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Spanish military.  While Spain currently spends 61.7% of its defense funds on its military 
personnel, this is down from the 1995 levels of 66.5% for personnel.235  Significantly, the 
largest drop in Spanish defense spending comes in the area of research and development.  
Spain has decreased its R&D budget from $252 million USD in 1997 to $174 million 
USD in 2001.236  Spain also utilizes its Science and Technology Ministry to conduct 
research and development.  
H.M. King Juan Carlos set the tone for civilian dealings with the military by 
calling for an increase in military spending following the tragedy of the mishap of the 
contracted YAK-42, carrying 62 Spanish personnel from Afghanistan in a post-
deployment rotation.  The King called for the government to increase the money that it 
spends for defense training and equipment.  Ironically, Spain was already planning to 
purchase 27 A400 cargo/transport aircraft to reduce the dependency on contracted 
carriers with suspect maintenance practices.237 
B. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION INTO EUROPEAN 
STRUCTURES 
Moreover, Spain is deeply involved with both European and American defense 
industrial arrangements.  Spain is not, however, as protectionist as some of the other 
more dominant members of the EU.  According to the International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, European countries belong in four groupings with respect to  
the percentage of equipment of US origin in service with the armed 
forces…group A (France and the United Kingdom): countries capable of 
producing the complete range of weapons systems, and importers of very 
little US equipment; group B (Germany): a country with the capacity to 
manufacture complete systems, and importer of very little US equipment; 
group C: countries with considerable (Italy, Spain and Sweden)… 
industrial capabilities, and purchasers of a medium amount of US 
equipment; group D: countries with little industrial capacity, and 
purchasers of a high percentage of US equipment (Denmark, Greece, 
Norway, Portugal and Turkey).238 
 
                                                 
235 NATO Press Release (2003) 146. 1 December 2003.  Financial and Economic Data Relating to 
NATO Defense – Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries (1980-2003).   
236 Ibid. 
237 International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance INTERNET 2002/2003. Vol 102. 
Issue 1. p. 34.   
64 
238 Gordon Adams, Christophe Cornu and Andrew D. James, Burkhard Schmitt (ed.), Between 
cooperation and competition: the transatlantic defence market (Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper 
44, January 2001). pp. 62-63.   
Spain does play a significant role in the direction that the European defense 
industry is taking.  Noteworthy mergers took place in the late 1990s within Europe that 
began to restructure the European defense industry.  While the mergers do not represent a 
true “European” defense industry, they show a level of governmental acceptance of 
interdependence in areas that have previously been guarded under solely sovereign 
control.  EU treaties specify the rules and levels of cooperation that EU member states 
may develop with defense industrial transactions.  Specifically, Article 296 of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam and Nice applies “when the merger has both military and nonmilitary 
applications.”  In such cases, “the Commission reviews the nonmilitary aspects of the 
deal, while national merger laws are applied to the military ones.”239 
Despite this cooperation, the Spanish government must still approve “any foreign 
investment in a Spanish defense company.”240  Additionally, the use of a “golden share” 
exists in the Spanish defense industries owned by foreign companies.241  Moreover, 
Spanish companies must “obtain approval, either for a geographical area, for exploring 
external markets, for obtaining permission to export weapons systems at…each phase of 
the export process.”242  Because of the nature and sensitivity of this process, the highest 
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level of government must sometimes approve “specific lists of products” that are under 
negotiation. 243    
In light of the growing acceptance of defense consolidation, three primary 
organizations have emerged that dominate the defense industry in Europe:  British 
Aerospace and GE-Marconi combined to create BAE Systems, while Aerospatiale-Matra, 
Dasa, and CASA of France, Germany and Spain, respectively, formed the European 
Aeronautic, Defense and Space Company (EADS).  The third major defense company in 
Europe is Thales from France.244  The motivation behind the Spanish government’s 
action is to create an environment that allows its defense corporations to make the most 
appropriate deals that they can with respect to the direction of the Spanish Ministry of 
Defense that are within the restrictions of Spanish laws. 
For example, cooperation between the major companies is seen with 
arrangements such as the relationship between Lockheed Martin of the US and EADS 
representing Spain, France and Germany with a licensing agreement for a Patriot missile 
upgrade.245  Also, the Meteor program involves a host of participants, to include BAE 
Systems, Saab and Boeing.246  This defense cooperation demonstrates that the integration 
of American and European businesses is seeking further opportunities for cooperation. 
US firms invest significantly in Spain allowing Spanish defense privatization 
programs to set the tone for defense modernization and armament projects.  For example, 
on July 25, 2001, the Spanish government negotiated the sale of an armored vehicle 
manufacturer, Santa Bárbara Blindados, and a munitions manufacturer, Nacional Santa 
Bárbara de Industrias Militares, to General Dynamics.  General Dynamics combined the 
two companies as Santa Barbara Sistemas, a firm that employs approximately 2000 
employees and will generate over $2 billion USD in back-log orders alone.247   
Until a consolidated European Agency for Armaments, Research and Capabilities 
stands up to unite and harmonize EU armament programs, Spain will pursue several 
initiatives with European and US partners for armament procurement.  Spain joined the 
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Western European Armaments Group and its subsidiary organization – the Western 
European Armaments Organization.  The Letter of Intent and the Framework Agreement 
concern measures that facilitate the restructuring and cooperating of the European 
defense industry and the European research grouping arrangement (ERG) No. 1 concern 
cooperative defense research and technology projects that began on 18 December 2001.     
The legal basis for this European interaction is from two primary agreements.  
The Letter of Intent (LoI) of 6 July 1998 between France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden 
and the UK defines the “framework for the measures to be taken by these states to 
accompany restructuring in the defense industry.”248  The Preamble to the Framework 
Agreement between France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and 
Northern Ireland concerning measures to facilitate the restructuring and operation of the 
European defense industry, signed at Farnborough, the United Kingdom, on 27 July 
2000, set forth the protocol to  
create the political and legal framework necessary to facilitate industrial 
restructuring in order to promote a more competitive and robust European 
defense technological and industrial base in the global defense market and 
thus to contribute to the construction of a common European security and 
defense policy.249 
 
In response to the European initiatives, the US Department of Defense (DOD), 
under the direction of the Clinton administration, established two countering initiatives 
designed to promote increased cooperation between European defense industrial 
companies and the US.  The US DOD created a bilateral Declaration of Principles 
(DOPs) with individual European nation-states, including Spain, and sought “the 
harmonization of defense trade rules, practices, and procedures.”250  Additionally, the US 
developed the Defense Trade Security Initiative (DTSI) that sought to restructure the US 
export control system.251 
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In contrast to the development of the LoI and DOP, France and Germany created 
the Organization for Joint Armaments Cooperation (OCCAR) on 12 November 1996 
with the inclusion of Italy and the UK.  
(The) working principles are designed to achieve true industrial and 
technological complementarity among the four countries; common 
procurement principles (competition governed by common rules yet to be 
worked out); renunciation of the detailed calculation of industrial juste 
retour programme by programme, in favour of an overall balance across 
several programmes and over several years; integrated transnational teams 
(both governmental and industrial).252 
 
Spain placed its order for the A400M through the OCCAR and has applied for 
membership within the OCCAR but has not been successful in this bid because of its 
request for more equal voting representation on the Board of Supervisors of the 
OCCAR.253  The OCCAR currently oversees major industrial projects like the A400M, 
Tiger, Roland, Boxer, Cobra and the Future Surface to Air Missile.  OCCAR 
representatives maintain that Spain must become part of another major program besides 
the A400M to garner larger representation on the Board.254   
C. SPANISH FORCE MODERNIZATION 
According to a paper presented to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Spain 
intends to purchase 24 Tiger helicopter for utilization on its new amphibious assault ship.   
Spain signed a contract in February (2003) to build a new multipurpose 
amphibious assault ship that is expected to be delivered in 2008. The ship 
will be able to carry four large helicopters or six smaller helicopters. It 
will also be able to carry short take-off and landing aircraft, and heavy 
equipment such as tanks or armoured personnel carriers. It will also be 
able to hold up to 1,355 personnel and doubles the capacity of Spain's two 
existing amphibious assault ships. This is part of a €4.6 billion package 
recently agreed to by the Spanish government. In addition to the 
multipurpose ship, Spain also plans to build four new submarines capable 
of firing cruise missiles, and 24 Tiger attack helicopters. Most of the 
funding for this package is expected to come from the sale of surplus 
Ministry of Defence property.255 
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Additionally, on 12 June 2003 Spain’s Defense Minister, Federico Trillo signed 
an agreement with 10 other defense ministers from NATO “to build capabilities on 
strategic sealift” that will continue to expand Spain’s defense modernization. 
Spain increased its defense budget from 7.3 bn (Euros) in 2002 to 7.5 bn 
(Euros) in 2003, although spending will fall in real terms.  Procurement 
funding was increased by 1.4% to 1.63 bn (Euros), 55% of which will go 
towards upgrades, 32% towards maintenance and 12% towards R&D.  
272m (Euros) and 96.5m (Euros) respectively (have) been earmarked for 
further development of Eurofighter and acquiring 27 A400M aircraft.256 
 
In another policy shift after the Socialist’s victory in March 2004, the Bono 
announced the decision to suspend the new agreements reached by Trillo.257  It is still 
uncertain what, if any, change will take place with this defense cooperation. 
The ability to project forces is driving Spanish procurement requirements for 
numbers and types of systems.  “Spain cannot produce the complete range of equipments 
but is capable of producing nationally the major armaments with which its forces are 
mainly equipped.”258  While Spain is not reinforcing a “Fortress Europe” system, Spain 
obtains approximately 32% of its current total military equipment from the US.259  “In 
the naval and land equipment sectors, the ‘Fortress Europe’ issue is more a question of 
confrontation between the different European industries than a struggle against American 
Industry.”260  
Spain demonstrates an even balance between defense initiatives with domestic 
suppliers, collective groups and the US in terms of weapons and defense system 
purchases.  Of its 27 defense modernization initiatives, seven are from domestic 
producers, including all naval vessels.  Five initiatives are through collective 
organizations such as the OCCAR to include the Helios I spy satellites for utilization at a 
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Satellite Center at Torrejón, Spain.261  Spain also has contracts for five defense systems 
initiatives with US firms for 30 F/A-18A, 100 AIM-120B, 12 C-130J, 12 Javelin and 6 
SH-60B.262 
While Spain has developed a significant independent ship building capability, 
many concurrent NATO agreements have ESDP implications: 
After having endorsed the recommendations of the High Level Group on 
Strategic Sealift, the Defence Ministers of nine nations (Canada, Denmark, 
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United 
Kingdom), signed a Multinational Implementation Arrangement (MIA) on 
1 December 2003, and agreed to acquire a capability package consisting of 
multinational and assured access charter. The NATO Maintenance and 
Supply Agency (NAMSA) was appointed to assist in developing contracts 
for the necessary assured access.263 
 
One of the key drawbacks to having an independent capability is the lessening of 
interoperability between navies and air forces in the EU.  To combat this, Spain, France, 
Germany and Italy are participating in a US common program called the Multifunction 
Information Distribution System (MIDS) that is designed to make their navies and air 
forces more interoperable with one another.264 
The European Air Group also attempts to improve cooperation and integration of 
European Union aviation assets.   
The fundamental objective of the EAG is to improve cooperation and 
interoperability between the participating air forces and to develop 
innovative solutions for optimizing their capabilities over a wide range of 
air power issues such as logistics, air operations, communications and the 
protection of air bases…Specifically, the group is tasked to find new 
approaches to help alleviate the shortfall in European airlift capability.265 
   
Spanish elites realize that their country does not need to maintain a 360-degree 
defensive posture.  Although Spain is attempting to improve its expeditionary 
capabilities, it has limited ability to deploy its forces for concurrent NATO and EU crisis 
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management operations.  Much of this limitation comes from the lack of strategic lift and 
power projection capability to deploy and support its forces once deployed.   
Spain currently has approximately 4366 military and civilian personnel abroad 
(approximately 3-4% of its total forces) supporting UN, NATO, EU or coalition 
operations.266  Table 1 lists the forces currently deployed in support of various 
operations.  This table highlights the level of capabilities and scope of the various 
operations and includes the forces scheduled to depart Iraq in May 2004. 
D. PARTICIPATION INTO EU-LED CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND 
DEFENSE MISSIONS 
Additionally, Spain participates in the development of the ESDP’s Civil-Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC) capability.267  While this capability is still limited, it represents 
how the EU can contribute to UN, OSCE and EU operations in a civil as well as military 
capacity. In the early 1990s, the Spanish political left, in particular, saw cooperation with 
the OSCE as preferable in certain situations over NATO.  In light of this, the PSOE 
believes that the alternative security arrangements with organizations such as the OSCE 
can “promote a new security system based neither on nuclear deterrence, nor on mutual 
distrust.”268     
While structural limitations exist for funding future EU operations, the process 
remains the result of developing the individual political wills of member states to take 
action in a given crisis, regardless of where the funding comes from.  Through the 
common fund of the EU, Spain contributes to the funding of EU-led operations such as 
Bosnia’s EUPM and Operation Concordia and its mission to the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo.  The key difference between EU military operations and the operations that 
have a predominately-civil impact is in the funding of those operations.  Civil operations 
come from the common budget of the EU whereas funding for military operations 
“remain under strict national control.”269 
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Spain’s contributions to common budgets are seen as an indicator of its 
commitment to the EU.  Spain ranks fifth in total contributions to the EU, behind 
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, respectively.  Consequently, Spain 
shares its proportional funding towards ESDP.  In actual terms, Spain contributes 7.46% 
of its GDP towards the EU.270   
As noted, Spain places a high emphasis on security to its south.  “North Africa is 
the source of a migratory flow northward, with the Mediterranean as a barrier of sorts.  
Spain, Italy and to a lesser degree France, are relatively exposed.”271  The direction of the 
EU respect to the development of its ESDP will come from the political will of its 
member states.  With the Barcelona Process and the Mediterranean Dialogue of NATO, 
Spain continually pushes the European Union and NATO towards improved relations 
with Mediterranean nations.  The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke of this  
Mediterranean dimension of Spanish foreign policy in the following 
terms: "The peace, stability and prosperity of the Mediterranean Basin and 
all the countries in it is one of the priorities of Spanish foreign policy (...) 
The enrichment of the Barcelona Process, the preparation of an overall 
joint EU strategy on the Mediterranean and the contribution to good 
progress of the Middle East peace process take on full importance in this 
framework and will continue to be one of the government's priorities.”272 
 
While Spain maintains the ability to support both NATO and EU operations, the 
Spanish role within ESDP is complicated.  Spain seeks an independent voice within the 
context of ESDP while maintaining strong relations with the US and NATO.  According 
to Spanish elites, EU actions cannot jeopardize Spain’s “historic” relationship with the 
US.273  This view also represents a common perception among newer members of the EU 
and NATO.  NATO and ESDP remain intrinsically linked and Spain sees no need in a 
change in this arrangement.  The newer members of NATO and the EU will support 
ESDP as long as NATO as an organization is not jeopardized.  Spain’s motivation behind 
supporting NATO is that the Spanish people do not want to see a European defense 
structure without the guarantee of US support. 
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Spain offers an example of how to maintain strong bilateral relations with the US 
while supporting NATO-led operations and contributing to the further integration of the 
EU.  Spain demonstrates the characteristics that the EU needs to promote a strong EU 
infrastructure and military posture to conduct autonomous actions.  As demonstrated in 
this chapter, Spain displays good interoperability while increasing its capabilities for the 
future.  The key for Spanish integration into further cooperation with ESDP will depend 
on developing a coherent policy with the rest of the European Union member states as 
well as developing the political will to act in actions that affect the periphery of the 
Union.  Internal rivalries will detract from the development of EU policy goals as well as 
the inability of the EU to solve structural problems with funding operations. 
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 EU-Led Under United Nations Mandate 
 
DROC (MONUC): 3 including 2 observers 
 
FYROM: (Op Concordia): 16 personnel 
 
Bosnia (EU Police Mission) 24 Police, 2 Civil Administrators  
 
NATO-Led Under UN Mandate 
 
Afghanistan (ISAF):  350 personnel (est) 
 
Bosnia (SFOR II):  1400 personnel; 2 Inf Convoy, 1 Cav Sqdr, 
 
Italy (Op Deliberate Forge): 4x F/A-18A, 1xKC-130 
 
Serbia & Montenegro (KFOR): 1300 personnel; 4 Inf Convoy, 1 Cav Sqdr 
 
Coalition Action Under UN Mandate 
 
Afghanistan (Op Enduring Freedom): 5xC-130; 8x CN-235, 1xP-3.   
  -Two frigates and one logistic ship deployed to the CENTCOM AOR to 
support continued operations in OEF. 
 
Iraq (Op Iraqi Freedom): 1300 (est) personnel (forces due to retrograde back to 
Spain as of 27 May 2004) 
 
-Deployed one medical facility (Level II+, 14 beds) embarked on an LPD and one 
deployable Field Hospital (Level II+, 40 beds) to North Arabian Gulf and Umm Qasr, 
respectively. To date, they have treated in excess of 1,800 non-enemy prisoner of war 
personnel and incorporated Lithuanian medical personnel in Spanish facility at Umm 
Qasr. A Marine platoon and engineer unit are supporting humanitarian reconstruction in 
the Umm Qasr and Basrah areas.274 
 
UN Led 
Ethiopia/Eritrea (UNMEE): 5 including 3 observers 
TABLE 1.  Spanish Forces deployed abroad (After USCENTCOM, Missiroli and The 
Military Balanc Internet 2003/2004) 275 
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This chapter’s begins with a summary of the strategic preferences of the political 
and military elites of Spain that define Spain’s strategic culture. The three case studies of 
how Spain integrated into NATO, supported out-of-territory defense missions and 
integrated into the EU’s European Security and Defense Policy offer important 
considerations for the future of the relationship between the US and Spain, Spain and 
NATO, and Spain and the European Union.  The three case studies represent a cognitive 
mapping of the decision-making processes of Spanish elites.  Through this thesis, 
strategists can better understand how Spanish elites view the function and efficacy of 
military force in international affairs.   
The method of analysis of this thesis was to deconstruct periods of relative crisis 
to gain a greater understanding of the motivation and thought processes behind the 
decisions of Spain’s political elites revealing their strategic preferences.  By determining 
the actions of the Spanish elites during a response to crisis periods, this thesis has sought 
to bring out certain aspects of the strategic preferences of Spanish elites that are lost in 
the discussions about how Spain developed its foreign policies in light of the Madrid 
bombings in 2004.   
The theme behind this thesis is that the decision-making processes of the Spanish 
elites do not depict the impetus behind how the Spanish government reacted during the 
events of March 2004 and that the actions of the PSOE are consistent with the historical 
strategic preferences of that political entity.  Neither the bombings on 11 March 2004 nor 
the outcome of the elections of 14 March 2004 represents a significant restructuring of 
the political setting in Spain.  To gain a more complete portrait of Spanish strategic 
culture, this thesis focused on the two major political movements in Spain as well as 
developing the role of the military through the political maturation process. 
The two major political entities, the PSOE and the PP, have definitive strategic 
preferences with noteworthy commonalities.  The second portion of this chapter draws 
conclusions on how the PSOE may build its foreign policy based on their strategic 
preferences as developed since 1975.  Similarities exist in how the PSOE and PP deal 
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with certain issues within foreign policy but this conclusion will bring out that Spain 
represents a microcosm of the differing political and ideological orientations within 
Europe that may offer further impetus for European integration.   
The final portion of this chapter builds on the understanding of the strategic 
importance of Spain to the US’s Global War on Terror.  As this thesis has demonstrated, 
without the Spanish bases and political support from various Spanish administrations, 
military actions during the Cold War and other military operations in the Mediterranean 
and Persian Gulf would not have been possible.  This basing support remains the focal 
point for the US security relationship between Spain and the US.  Support for counter-
terrorism operations continues to dominate the Spanish political processes.  This thesis 
will offer additional policy recommendation directed to the US Executive Branch to 
highlight strategic concerns relating to the transatlantic relationship between the US and 
Spain and the US and the EU.  This policy recommendation will focus on measures the 
US Executive Branch might consider to regain the initiative on the Global War on Terror. 
B. STRATEGIC PREFERENCES 
The formation of the collective identities of the primary groups within Spanish 
politics demonstrated how Spanish elites became socialized in particular ideologies.  The 
process by which elites became socialized is important to understand because of the 
evolution by which the Spanish elites formed their strategic preferences.  As a review, 
“elites socialized in different strategic cultures will make different choices when placed 
in similar situations.”276  Three key points that affected this formation of collective 
identities of the Spanish leaders were the traditional confrontations between liberals and 
conservatives, the weak development of nationalism built around the autonomous 
communities and the movement of both the liberals and conservatives to more centrist 
and moderate positions.   
Due to the late development of industrialization in Spain, much of the formation 
of the modern liberal policy coincided with the realization that Spain was no longer a 
global power after the loss of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898.  Historically, the key 
differences between the parties are that the conservative groups preferred more 
centralized power while maintaining the values of “classical liberalism” and “traditional 
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Catholicism.”  Conversely, in the original political mandate of the PSOE, the Left 
preferred a greater degree of regional autonomy with greater social freedoms and the 
absence of the Catholic Church in government.   
Another key to the formation of the strategic preferences was that nationalism 
remained weak in Spain.  Unlike much of Europe, the conservative governments in Spain 
were able to suppress the nationalistic movements of the left but still allowed for a 
measure of regional autonomy.  As a result, the desire to protect regional autonomy 
remained a strong inspiration for policies of the various governments in the last century.  
The effects of this regionalism reflect in domestic policies of the PP and PSOE that differ 
with respect to the degree and scope of the amount of autonomy for the regions.  While 
the PP prefers the current constitutional provisions that maintain a strong central state, 
the PSOE is seeking a constitutional amendment for a restructuring of the upper house of 
the Cortes that provides greater checks and balances with regards to decisions of the 
Parliament.277 
A primary socialization issue that influenced the development of Spain’s strategic 
preferences was the ideological movements of both the Left and the Right towards the 
center and more moderate positions in the late 1970s.  The hard-line right and the 
extremely radical left ideologies were detrimental to the development of democracy in 
Spain during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in 1923, the 2nd Republic of 1933-1936 
and the Franco dictatorship from 1939-1975.  This ideological movement of the Spanish 
elites corresponded with a popular rejection of nationalistic symbols from the 
authoritarian past under the Franco regime.  This pacifistic and anti-nationalistic 
movement still resonates in public opinion towards international affairs.     
Strategic preferences become apparent after understanding how socialization 
issues affected the ideological development of Spanish elites.  A key strategic preference 
that begins with Franco in 1936 and continues through the current political discussions is 
that the Spanish right exchanged reciprocal support to countries that provided military, 
political or economic support to Spain.  By reciprocating this support, Spain’s 
demonstrated its international obligation through its commitment to non-territorial 
security operations and burden sharing arrangements through international organizations.  
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Because of Spain’s strategic location and historical alliances, Spain is also able to provide 
influence through dialogue with friendly governments or alliances that maintain Spain’s 
regional influence in both Latin America and Northern Africa. 
The PSOE also adheres to the principles of reciprocal support but to a point.  The 
PSOE, as well as many other EU members, requires additional measures of international 
legitimacy to justify the deployment of military personnel outside of the territory of 
Spain.  While both the PSOE and PP have demonstrated the political will to support 
deployment of forces for out-of-area operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and the Gulf 
Wars, the PSOE is more sensitive to public opinion than the PP.  This is the underlying 
consideration behind the PSOE limiting their involvement in international security 
operations.  Operations that gain international legitimacy from either NATO or the UN 
are much more favorable than modern coalitions.  Without this measure of international 
justification, the PSOE will probably not actively support belligerent combat operations.   
Still, key ideological divisions exist.  It is an oversimplification that the PP seeks 
an independent voice through foreign policy alignment with the US and that the PSOE 
seeks to become more “European” in its strategic outlook.  Both PP and PSOE realize 
that Spain is in a unique position to continue a strong bilateral relationship with the US 
while the PSOE leadership shies away from the development of a Paris-Berlin-Madrid 
axis in the EU.  Spanish elites desire to be in the  
vanguard of the European Union…But we also want the United Kingdom 
in that vanguard.  Europe cannot be built without the presence of such an 
important country as the United Kingdom.  And Europe cannot be 
understood except in terms of all of its 25 members – each has its national 
sensibilities, its interests, its priorities, and its ambitions.278   
 
Since 1981, the PSOE has also adopted pro-European nature.  The origin of this 
European orientation is the result of the return of the exiles to Spain.  One Spanish 
viewpoint is that after the reinstitution of democracy in Spain, the exiles that had left 
Spain during the Franco years returned from France, Germany and England who upon 
return to Spain professed that “the real Spanish patriotism consisted in wanting to live 
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like the Europeans par excellence – who, for many of us were the French.”279  Under 
French tutelage, the PSOE developed a comprehensive and independent foreign policy 
that sought independence from a “unilateral or preferential alliance.”280  With that, the 
evolution of the PSOE seeks a foreign policy of equal stature to the French as well as to 
the United States.  As seen when confronted with unilateral behavior from the US, the 
PSOE responded with the aggressive withdrawal from the coalition in Iraq. 
C. INTERPRETATION OF SPANISH FOREIGN POLICY 
As with most modern democracies, the dominant political group is able to 
establish the national priorities that demonstrate strategic preferences of that particular 
group.  In general, Spanish foreign policy has fundamental philosophical differences that 
do exist stemming from the traditional confrontation between the liberal and conservative 
parties.   
The period from 1996-2004 under the PP administration under President José 
Maria Aznar demonstrated a new spectrum of political leadership in international security 
affairs.  The PSOE may learn to build on that leadership role maintaining its importance 
not only in European Union affairs but also in world affairs.  Under the PP, Spain was 
attempting to find an independent voice within the context of European Union and 
NATO security structures.  This attitude resonated through the whole of the PP’s foreign 
policies.  The PSOE is still highly critical of the PP’s foreign policy citing the over 
reliance on the US for support in international affairs and the level of support that the PP 
gave to the US administration particularly in the 2003-2004 operations in Iraq.   
While the Spanish right represented the prototypic “Atlanticist” attitudes that 
prevails in much of Southern and Eastern Europe, the PSOE believes that “Europe first” 
should be the primary foreign policy orientation.  The conservative critique of the PSOE 
foreign policy is that it will follow the policy orientations of the French and Germans 
with respect to European integration.  As both the PP and PSOE agree, the bilateral 
relationship with US is an important aspect in developing Spain’s foreign policy.  
Ideological and political commonalities exist between the political and military elites of 
Spain that are representative of a larger portion of the European Union.     
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Based on the strategic preferences of the PSOE, the PSOE will seek greater 
integration into the European Union – not from a need to move away from the US but 
through a desire to contribute to a unified European Union with 25 members.  With 
European Union integration policy, the PSOE may benefit the most from the PP’s 
insistence on greater parity for Spain’s position through negotiations of the Treaty for a 
Constitution of the European Union.  While moderating the PP’s views, the PSOE 
defines its motivations to seek greater unification in Europe as a need “to work together, 
harmonize our interests, look for common political projects, and on that basis, create a 
European project that is both attractive and useful.”281      
In either case, the foreign policies of the PSOE offer a compelling vision of 
possible security initiatives due to Spain’s strategic relationship with North African and 
Latin American countries.  The ability to preempt security problems in regions that the 
US is attempting to penetrate will counter the environment favorable for terrorist 
recruitment and activity.  Counter-terrorism is still a sensitive subject with the PSOE and 
allows an area that is available for cooperation between the US and Spain and the EU and 
Spain. 
The under developed security institutions of the EU will be strengthened by 
Spain’s policy shift towards the EU.  The development of the EU’s Counter-terrorism 
group on 30 March 2004 is a key development on how events in Spain provided an 
impetus for further EU integration.  While counterterrorism is a central theme for both 
sides of the Atlantic, Javier Solana, with Spanish support, directed the development of an 
intergovernmental counterterrorism organization that could contribute to operations of 
the US Department of Homeland Security.  Currently the EU is developing the equivalent 
organizational structure to coordinate and monitor anti-terrorism operations within the 
EU.     
A significant difference between the PSOE and the PP will be with Spain’s 
commitment to international organizations.  In this respect, NATO and the UN will take 
lead roles in determining how Spain will develop security responses to global security 
challenges.  Both PSOE and PP realize that Spain should not maintain a 360-degree 
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defense posture but budget constraints will necessitate further integration into defense 
structures that maintain multilateral legitimacy.   
As indicated in the reported discussions between Secretary Rumsfeld and Mr. 
Bono, the PSOE may not appreciate the nuanced political relationship between the US 
and UN in terms of UN commanders leading US forces and Spain may be unwilling to 
participate in operations that are not led by a UN or NATO commander.  In that respect, 
Spanish participation in NATO and organizational support will prove less problematic for 
both the PSOE and the US and could be the avenue pursued for security integration 
between the US and Spain beyond the bilateral agreements already established.   
Through defense industrial cooperation, the PSOE may also make the mistake of 
acting on no clear mandate to cut the level of economic integration with existing defense 
contracts that were providing benefits to Spanish industrial development.  Prior to the 
bombings, the majority of Spaniards were heavily in favor of the PP government because 
of the PP’s economic programs in spite of the implications of maintaining Spanish forces 
in Iraq.  The PSOE may overstep its mandate for change in this respect.   Cutting defense 
spending that affects the Spanish industry will be a major obstacle to defense industrial 
development of Spain. 
D. US FOREIGN POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
Because of the US reliance on the continued military and basing support from 
Spain, this assessment of the current state of defense burden sharing between the US and 
Spain and the Spanish commitment to the Global War on Terror deals primarily with 
maintaining the security relationship with Spain through Atlantic Alliance structures.  
The most probable effect of the turnover of power in Spain will be an increase in Spanish 
participation in international organizations.  The PSOE views NATO and the EU’s 
Common and Foreign Security Policy concerning the EU’s crisis management structures 
as having a certain standard of legitimacy not found in their current bilateral relationship 
with the US.   
As for possible areas that the US could seek additional engagement with the 
policy orientations of the PSOE would be towards their security concerns in Africa and 
Latin America.  Spain can provide significant leadership in dealing with governments in 
those regions.  Through Mediterranean Dialogue, the US can lead NATO’s expansion 
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into the Mediterranean and Northern Africa, which represents the direction that Spain 
envisions as its strategic priority.  For example, the close cooperation between the 
Kingdoms of Morocco and Spain during the investigation of the March bombings 
indicates that dialogue is possible that will contribute to greater resolution to handling 
immigration problems and poverty issues that affect the Spanish and Moroccan 
relationship. 
Aspects of US foreign policy remain contentious to the PSOE.  The Pentagon’s 
policy of awarding defense contracts to the companies that participated in operations in 
Iraq also had a political effect against the US policy.  After Spain supported the 
operations in Iraq, the Pentagon shut Spain out of contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq.  
In addition, a key point for the continued Spanish support in Iraq was that the PSOE 
expressed to the US that Spain desired further negotiations via the UN to keep Spanish 
forces in Iraq.  Through the actions of the US forces in Iraq, the PSOE did not perceive 
that the US was treating Spain as a political and diplomatic equal in developing a strategy 
for operations in Iraq. 
The PSOE makes a clear distinction between the operations in Iraq with NATO 
operations in Afghanistan.  This mirrors the European Union position that the Operation 
Iraqi Freedom has little to do with the US-led Global War on Terror.  In light of the break 
with Spanish leadership, the coalition in Iraq is weaker politically without Spanish 
support.  Spanish influence is most readily seen through the defections in the smaller 
countries out of the coalition.  To reengage Spain and other members of the EU that are 
not currently part of the coalition, the US would need to alter its National Security 
Strategy away from the perceived autarkic policy of preemptive military actions against 
threats.   
The unilateral behavior and non-consultation by the US administration led to the 
early defection of Spain and others from the coalition in Iraq.  Until a shift in US policy 
occurs, it is likely that no other EU members will assist in reconstruction or humanitarian 
operations in Iraq.  The Spanish position towards consultation represents the views of 
similar sized nation-states in Southern Europe and Latin American that have like beliefs 
towards the US-led Global War on Terror.  Several countries in Europe, Northern Africa 
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and Latin America have already followed Spain’s lead in developing an independent 
strategy towards the Global War on Terror.   
Based on the lessons from this strategic culture analysis of Spain that identified 
the strategic preferences of the PSOE, a linkage develops for Spain to rely more heavily 
on international institutions for their engagement in security operations.  Reliance on 
international organizations is a common viewpoint of the majority of EU members.  
Through this commonality with other prominent members of the EU, Spain provides a 
unifying element to the EU because of its political and economic potential within the EU.  
Therefore, Spanish political support will contribute to greater solidarity to the political 
will of the EU decision makers. 
The lack of international support for the Global War on Terror may create a 
potentially severe drain on US resources causing the US to expend too many human and 
fiscal resources to carry the burden for the majority of the security in Iraq.  The further 
loss of international involvement in Iraq will have a strategic impact of the National 
Guard, active and reserve Marines, sailors and soldiers that prosecute operations in Iraq, 
actions in Afghanistan and defense of the US homeland simultaneously.  
Because of the lack of international agreement over the conduct and legitimacy of 
the US-led coalition in Iraq, US national interests in Europe and Southwest Asia are at 
risk if the US administration does not adapt a coherent foreign policy concerning the 
operations in Iraq.  As a starting point, pursuing support from the UN will be 
unproductive without the full political and economic weight of the European Union.  The 
UN will not be able to affect a change in the security in Iraq unless the EU as a whole 
engages in the operations in Iraq.  For the EU to fully engage with the combined 
economic, political, diplomatic and military capabilities in Iraq, however, the US would 
need a fundamental shift in its National Security Strategy away from the perception of 
unilateralism and non-consultation.  The further inclusion of the EU in Iraq will probably 
not occur until the US foreign policy adjusts to a position more favorable to European 
Union involvement.  The result of the lack of international and EU support is that the US 
will continue to share the unequal burden of security in Iraq after the turnover of 
sovereignty to the Iraqi interim government on 30 June 2004.   
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Beyond Iraq and in the fight against global terrorism, the US foreign policy will 
eventually need to further develop the US diplomatic mission to the EU with its 
increasingly federal structures in order to integrate the US Department of Homeland 
Security with the diplomatic, defense, economic and counterterrorism agendas of the US 





Mansito, F., Representative Adjunct – Political Security Committee to the 
European Union. 10 Dec 03. Brussels, BE.  Spanish Embassy – Belgium. 
 
Hoffman, R. J., Senior Lecturer, Center for Civil-Military Relations, School of 
International Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School and Strategic Planner, 
Defense Operations Division, Office of the Defense Advisor to NATO and 
SECDEFREPEUR - 1989-1993.  27 April 2004.  Monterey, CA. 
 
BOOKS 
Acheson, D. 1969.  Present at the Creation:  My years in the State Department. 
New York.  WW Norton & Company. 
 
Agüero, F. 1995.  Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in 
Comparative Perspective.  Baltimore.  The John Hopkins University Press. 
 
Baloyra, E.A. 1987.  Comparing New Democracies:  Transition and 
Consolidation in Mediterranean Europe and the Southern Cone.  Boulder, Co.  Westview 
Press. 
 
Beevor, A. 1982.  The Spanish Civil War.  London.  Penguin Books. 
 
Bono, G.  2003.  NATO’s ‘Peace-Enforcement’ Tasks and ‘Policy Communities’:  
1990-1999.  Burlington, VT.  Ashgate Publishing Company.   
 
Bueno de Mesquita, B. 1981. The Time Warp. New Haven, Conn. Yale University 
Press. 
 
Booth, K.  1979. Strategy and Ethnocentricity.  New York. Holmes and Meirer 
Publishing, Inc. 
 
De Francisco, C. (ed) 2002.  Spain Today. Madrid. Government Spokesman’s 
Office.  Translated by Dwight Porter. 
 
Heywood, P. 1995.  The Government and Politics of Spain.  New York. St. 
Martin’s Press. 
 
Kissinger, H. 1994.  Diplomacy.  New York. Simon and Schuster. 
 
Malia, M. 1994.  The Soviet Tragedy – A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-
1991.  New York. The Free Press. 
 
85 
NATO Handbook. 2002. 
 
Payne, S.G. 1967. Franco’s Spain. New York. Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 
 
Payne, S.G. 1995.  A History of Fascism 1914-1945. Madison.  The University of 
Wisconsin Press. 
 
Schulze, H. 1996.  States, Nations and Nationalism.  Malden, Mass.  Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd. 
 
Stein, H. ed. 1963. American Civil-Military Decisions:  A Book of Case Studies. 
Birmingham, AL. 
 
Tusell, J. 1992.  Franco en la Guerra Civil. Madrid.  
 
Preston, P. 1993. Franco. London.  Basic Books. 
 
Rubottom, R. & Murphey, JC. 1984. Spain and the United States since World 
War II. New York.   
 
Viñas, Angel. 1981. Los pactos secretos de Franco con Estados Unidos. Bases, 
ayuda económica, recortes de soberania. Barcelona. Grijalbo. 
 
Wilkenson, J. and Hughes, H.S.  2004.  Contemporary Europe – A History (Tenth 
Edition).  Upper Saddle River, NJ.  Pearson Prentice Hall. 
 
CHAILLOT PAPERS AND OCCASIONAL PAPERS  
Adams, G., Cornu, C. and James, A.D., Schmitt, B. (ed.), January 2001.  Between 
Cooperation and Competition: The Transatlantic Defence Market.  Institute for Security 
Studies. Chaillot Paper 44.  
 
Ehrhart, Hans-George. October 2002.  What Model for CFSP?  Paris.  Institute for 
Security Studies. Chaillot Paper No. 55. 
 
Heisbourg, F.  September 2000.  European Defense:  Making it Work.  Paris.  
Institute for Security Studies – Western European Union.  Chaillot Paper No. 42. 
 
Missiroli, A. June 2003. Euros for ESDP:  Financing EU Operations.  Paris – 
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies. Occasional Paper No. 45.  
 
Schmitt, B. August 2003. The European Union and Armaments – Getting the 
Bigger Bang for the Euro. Paris. Chaillot Paper No. 63. 
 
Vlachos-Dengler, K. November 2002.  Getting There: Building Strategic Mobility 




EUROPEAN UNION SOURCES 
European Council.  12 December 2003. A Secure Europe in a Better World – 
European Security Strategy.  Brussels, BE.  
 
European Union Treaty of Amsterdam accessed on 18 May 2004 at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/treaties_other.html  
 
European Union Treaty of Nice accessed on 18 May 2004 at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/search/search_treaties.html 
 
Serfaty, S. (ed). The future of the transatlantic defense community: final report of 
the CSIS Commission on Transatlantic Security and Industrial Cooperation in the 
Twenty-first Century.  Center for Strategic International Studies Commission on 
Transatlantic Security and Industrial Cooperation in the Twenty-first Century. 
 
JOURNALS 
Johnston, A.I. “Thinking About Strategic Culture.”  International Security, Vol 
19, No. 4 Spring 95.  
 
Lindley-French, J. 3 Dec 03. European Defense-Lite: Why European Defense is 
Less About Defense and More About Politics.  Real Instituto Elcano – de Estudios 
Internacionales y Estratégicos.   
 
Madigan, S. “General Dynamics Acquires Two Spanish Arms Makers.” 
Washington Business Journal. 23 Jul 2001. 
  
International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance 2002/2003. Vol 
102. Issue 1.   
 
International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance 2003/2004. Vol 
103. Issue 1.   
 
Viñas, A.  September 2003.  Negotiating the U.S.-Spanish Agreements, 1953-
1988:  A Spanish Perspective.  Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series, Vol. 3. No. 7.  
University of Miami. 
 
BRITISH GOVERNMENT SOURCES 
Foreign Office General Correspondence - Balfour to Young, 28 March 1951, 
FO371/96183, WS1071/36 
 
Foreign Office General Correspondence - Burrows (Washington) to Young, 4 
September 1950. FO371/89503, WS1051/69  
 
87 
Foreign Office General Correspondence - Franks to FO, 19 January 1950, 
FO371/89496, WS10345/3, WS10345/4 
 
Foreign Office General Correspondence - Hoyer-Miller to Bevin, 13 February 
1950, FO371/89496, WS10345/13 
 
Foreign Office General Correspondence - Younger to Bevin, 3 August 1950, 
FO371/89502, WS1031/39 
 
Foreign Office General Correspondence - W.I. Mallet to Bevin, 2 August 1950, 
11 September 1950, FO371/89503, WS1051/63 
 
NATO SOURCES 
Allied Forces Southern Europe – Fact Sheet.  Summary of Operations – Operation 
DELIBERATE FORCE.   
 
Calpha, M. J. 147 DSCTC 03 E – Reform Of NATO Command  Structure and the 
NATO Response Force. NATO Parliamentary Assembly.  
 
NATO Press Release. 26 Apr 96. King Juan Carlos address to North Atlantic 
Council NATO HQ Brussels, BE.  http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s960426a.htm 
 
NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency. 19 February 2004. 
http://www.namsa.nato.int/news/news_e.htm 
 
NATO Press Release (2003) 146. 1 December 2003.  Financial and Economic 
Data Relating to NATO Defense – Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries (1980-
2003).  http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2003/p03-146e.htm 
 
SPANISH GOVERNMENT SOURCES 
De Francisco, C. (ed) 2002.  Spain Today. La Moncloa, Madrid - Government 
Spokesman’s Office. Translated by Dwight Porter. 
 
US GOVERNMENT SOURCES 
Foreign Relations of the United States.  1950.  Vol III. Washington, DC. 
Government Printing Office, 1977. 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States.  1951 Vol I. Washington, DC. 
Government Printing Office, 1978. 
 
Foreign Relations of the United States.  1954.  Vol IV. Washington, DC. 
Government Printing Office, 1979. 
 
88 
Gordon, P.  31 March 2004.  “The Effects of the Madrid Terrorist Attacks on US 
European Cooperation in the War on Terrorism.” Hearing before the Committee on 
Foreign Relations – United States Senate, 108th Congress, Second Session.  Washington, 
DC.  Mr. Gordon is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on the United States and 
Europe at the Brookings Institution. 
 
United States Central Command Website.  Accessed on 22 May 2004 at  
http://www.centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition/Coalition_pages/spain.htm 
 
US Department of State - Bowman, S. R. 8 Jul 2003.  Congressional Research 
Service – CRS Issue Brief for Congress:  Bosnia: US Military Operations.  
 
US Department of State - US Ambassador to Spain – Ambassador George L. 
Argyros. “Spain and the United States Today.” A commentary published in ABC 
newspaper on Apr 10, 2002. 
 
US General Accounting Office. 22 May 98.  United States General Accounting 
Office Letter Report.  “NATO:  History of Common Budget Cost Shares.” GAO/NSIAD-
98-172.   
 
United States Agency for International Development – US Overseas Loans & 
Grants Online.  Country Data – Spain. http://esdb.cdie.org/cgi-
bin2/broker.exe?_program=gbkprogs.ctypage_2.sas&_service=default&type=std&output
=2&cocode=4ESP (Accessed April 2004) 
 
NEWS PRINT  
ABC (Es). Apr 10, 2002. US Ambassador to Spain – Ambassador George L. 
Argyros. “Spain and the United States Today.” A commentary published in ABC 
newspaper.  
 
Almunia, J., Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, European Union, 
interview in Yarnoz, C.  18 May 2004.  El País 
 
El País. 15 July 96.  Editorial. 
 
Elkin, M.  28 April 2004.  “Zapatero tells Congress all Spanish troops will have 
left Iraq by May 27.” El País. 
 
Elkin, M.  12 May 2004.  “Zapatero proposes constitutional reform for Senate.”  
El País 
 




Gonzalez, M. 13 August 03. “The Diplomatic Hurdle.” Wall Street Journal 
Europe. 
 
Gonzalez, M.  26 April 2004.  “NATO asks Spain to assume control of security in 
Afghanistan province.”  El País. 
 
Julia, S.  17 May 2004.  “Roots of our ‘Europeanism.’”  El País.   
 
Luttwak, E.N. 16 March 2004. “Rewarding Terror in Spain.” New York Times. 
 
Vidal-Folch, X.  11 May 2004.  “Report by military chiefs regarding Iraq situation 
precipitated troop withdrawal.”  El País.   
 
Vinocur, J. 23 October 2003. “Spain touts a Europe with new power core: As host 
of Iraq donors meeting, it steps further away from France and Germany.” International 
Herald Tribune.  
 
INTERNET SOURCES 
BBC News.  18 March 2004.  “NATO sends more troops to Kosovo.”  BBC 
MMIV.  Accessed on 6 May 2004 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3522230.stm 
 
BBC News.  UK Edition.  13 May 2003.  “BAA ‘golden share’ ruled illegal.”  
Accessed 19 April 2004 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3022809.stm 
 
BBC News. “Spain.” BBC MMIV. Accessed on 6 May 2004 at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/on_kosovo_map/spain.htm 
 
CNN.  20 Jul 02. “Spain, Morocco strike island deal.”  Accessed on 23 April 2004 
at  http://www.intellnet.org/news/2002/07/20/10380-1.html 
 
International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance INTERNET 
2002/2003. Vol 102. Issue 1.  Accessed on 17 May 2004 at 
http://www3.oup.co.uk/milbal/hdb/Volume_102/Issue_01/ 
 
International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance INTERNET 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
  
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Fort Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library  
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  
 
3. Marine Corps Representative  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Monterey, California  
 
4. Director, Training and Education, MCCDC, Code C46  
Quantico, Virginia  
 
5. Director, Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, Code C40RC  
Quantico, Virginia  
 
6. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (Attn: Operations Officer)  
 Camp Pendleton, California 
